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A perennial issue in corporate law reform is the desirability of a
federal system. For notwithstanding the invasive growth of regula-
tion by the national government, principally through the federal se-
curities laws, corporate law is still the domain of the states. While no
two corporation codes are identical, there is substantial uniformity
across the states. Provisions typically spread in a discernible S-shaped
pattern, as one state amends its code in response to another state's
innovation.' The revision process is often analogized in the academic
literature to market competition, in which states compete to provide
firms with a product, corporate charters, in order to obtain franchise
tax revenues.2 This characterization is the centerpiece of the federal-
ism debate in corporate law-whether competition, and hence a fed-
eral system, benefits shareholders. The hero-or culprit-in the
debate is Delaware, the most successful state in the market for corpo-
rate charters.
Delaware's preeminence and its impact on who benefits from
competition is the subject of this paper, which is essentially a survey
of the recent learning on state competition. After a sketch of the con-
ventional moves in the state competition debate, I summarize a trans-
action cost explanation for Delaware's success. Next, I briefly
examine a controversial subset of state laws-antitakeover statutes-
whose problematic place in corporation codes muddies the debate.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Rick Antle, Lucian Bebchuk,
Bob Clark, Henry Hansmann, Lewis Kornhauser, Saul Levmore, Isaac Meilijson, George
Priest, Jeff Strnad, Elliott Weiss, Oliver Williamson and participants at workshops at the
Northwestern and Yale Law Schools and at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Confer-
ence on The Forces Shaping Corporate Law, and the Harvard Law School Conference on the
Economics of Corporate and Capital Markets Law, for helpful comments and suggestions.
I See Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 225, 233-35 (1985). The enactment of general incorporation statutes in the 19th and
early 20th centuries follows a pattern similar to what we observe today. See Shughart & Tol-
lison, Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change, 23 Econ.
Inquiry 585 (1985). A recent graphic example of statutory invention and imitation is Mary-
land's second generation takeover statute which requires a supermajority vote in certain busi-
ness combinations. Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
This statute was enacted in 1983 and in less than two years had been adopted by nine other
states.
2 See, e.g., Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 255 (1977).
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Thereafter, I review the findings of empirical studies that have sought
to arbitrate the state competition debate by employing financial
econometric techniques. Having evaluated the literature, I take a fi-
nal look at state competition by investigating two parameters of im-
portance to any legal system-optimality and stability-through a
simple, if not crude, stochastic model of the evolution of a corporate
charter market. I conclude by discussing the implications of this new
learning on state competition for public policy.
I. THE STATE COMPETITION LITERATURE
A. The Classic Positions Revisited
The foundation of the federalism debate in corporate law is that
revenues derived from franchise taxes provide a powerful incentive for
state legislatures to implement corporation codes that will maintain
the number of domiciled corporations, if not lure new firms to incor-
porate in their state. All participants in the debate believe that the
income produced by the chartering business spurs states to enact laws
that firms desire.3 This behavioral assumption is plausible: There is a
positive linear relation between the percentage of total revenues that
states obtain from franchise taxes and states' responsiveness to firms
in their corporate codes.4 The more dependent a state is on income
from franchise tax revenues, the more responsive is its corporation
code. The potential revenue from this tax source can be substantial
for a small state. Delaware's franchise tax revenue averaged 15.8 per-
cent of its total revenue from 1960-1980, and while it is impossible to
generate a precise figure, this income considerably outdistances the
cost of operating its chartering business.'
Given the shared assertion that revenues compel states to be re-
sponsive to firms' demands for legislation, the crux of the dispute is,
therefore, whether this responsiveness is for the better. Because of the
separation of ownership and control in the management of many large
public corporations, when a firm's managers propose a reincorpora-
tion or urge the enactment of a statute, no less the adoption of a char-
ter provision, we are concerned about whether they are maximizing
the value of the firm. This is the classic agency problem, which goes
to the heart of corporation law in a pluralist democracy: How do
principals-the shareholders-ensure that their agents-the manag-
3 E.g., id. (supporting state codes); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) (supporting national regulation).
4 Romano, supra note 1, at 239-40.
5 Id. at 240-42.
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ers-behave faithfully?6
Advocates of a national corporation law have termed state com-
petition a race for the bottom because they believe that managers'
discretion is unfettered, enabling them to promote laws that are detri-
mental to shareholders' welfare.7 They base this conclusion on a
characterization of the statutes and case law of Delaware-which is
the most frequent location for a reincorporation-as excessively per-
missive, by which they mean tilted toward management. Proponents
of the current federal system, however, question this phrasing of the
issue, typically viewing the agency problem as trivial. They maintain
that the many markets in which firms operate-the product, capital,
and labor markets-constrain managers to further the shareholders'
interests. Accordingly, in their view, conflict between investors and
managers over the content of state laws is largely illusory, and the
laws that are promulgated can best be explained as mechanisms for
maximizing equity share prices.
The initial articulation of the market argument in the state com-
petition debate was by Ralph Winter.8 Responding to William Cary,
who launched the first salvo in the modern debate,9 Winter contended
that if management chose a state whose laws were adverse to the
shareholders' interests, the value of the firm's stock would decline rel-
ative to stock in a comparable firm incorporated in a state with value-
maximizing laws, as investors would require a higher return on capi-
tal to finance the business operating under the inferior legal regime.
This impact in the capital market would affect managers by threaten-
ing their jobs. Either the lower stock price would attract a takeover
artist who could turn a profit by acquiring the firm and relocating it in
a state with superior laws, or the firm would go bankrupt by being
undercut in its product market by rivals whose cost of capital would
be lower because they were incorporated in value-maximizing states.
In either scenario, in order to maintain their positions, managers are
compelled, by natural selection, to seek the state whose laws are most
favorable to shareholders.
Winter's critique is devastating to Cary's analysis because Cary
completely overlooked the interaction of markets on managers' incen-
tives. Yet Cary's position cannot be entirely dismissed: More sophis-
ticated proponents of national chartering can move to another line of
6 See Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 928-29,
955-56, 1013-14 (1984).
7 E.g., Cary, supra note 3, at 666.
s Winter, supra note 2.
9 Cary, supra note 3.
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attack by maintaining that there is a true difference in opinion that
turns upon Cary's and Winter's assessments of the disciplining effect
of markets on managers. Winter can assume away the agency prob-
lem because of his view that the capital market is efficient such that
information concerning the impact of different legal regimes is pub-
licly available and fully assimilated into stock prices. In contrast,
support for national chartering presupposes a market that is, at best,
only weakly efficient, such that it does not digest information con-
cerning legal rules. In addition, even if stock prices accurately reflect
the value of different legal regimes, if product markets are not com-
petitive or the costs of takeovers are substantial, then a manager's
livelihood may not be jeopardized by the choice of a non-value-maxi-
mizing incorporation state. When the debate is phrased in this way,
the disagreement is over an empirical question concerning market effi-
ciency, for which, in principle, there is a clean answer.
To be sure, Cary sees a failure not only in financial and product
markets, but also in local politics. His recommendation of national
standards for corporations implies that the political process at the na-
tional level differs fundamentally from that of the states. Cary consid-
ers the flaw in Delaware's code to be a function of that state's desire
for revenue and the close personal connections between Delaware leg-
islators, judges, and corporate law firms."° The national government
certainly would not be as sensitive to franchise tax dollars as would a
small state, and practically speaking, there would be no competing
sovereigns to attract dissatisfied corporations.
But even if we grant Cary's premise that the states' responsive-
ness is the source of the problem, the elimination of intergovernmen-
tal competition is not necessarily the cure. The hitch in Cary's
position is that he leaves unexplained why national legislators in pur-
suit of reelection would be less susceptible to the political influence of
managers for "pet" statutes than state legislators. For why should
diffuse and unorganized shareholders be appreciably better able to
communicate their views to Congress when they cannot do so to state
legislatures?1 There are countless pieces of legislation produced by
10 Id. at 690-92.
11 If the claim is that communication costs are lower when there is only one legislature, the
obvious response is that even with state competition, only one state matters, Delaware, where a
large number of firms reside. Putting it this way makes clear that competition is the linchpin
of the argument. Cary must argue that another state would come to the managers' rescue if
shareholder lobbyists succeeded in Delaware, thereby making such expenditures futile,
whereas no such alternatives would exist in a national scheme. The transaction cost explana-
tion of state competition discussed infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text suggests that there
is friction in the chartering market, involving transaction specific assets that tie together partic-
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pork barrel politics in Congress-the tax code is perhaps the most
notable example-and there is no convincing reason to believe that
firms' managers would be any less skilled at protecting their interests
when it comes to a federal corporation code.12
B. An Extension of the Debate: Product Differentiation Stories
Both Cary's and Winter's explanations of state competition pre-
dict a trend toward uniformity across state corporation codes. In ad-
dition, they imply a process of constant disequilibrium in which the
system swings back and forth between corner solutions: As soon as
one state innovates with a new provision, all managers should, theo-
retically, reincorporate in that state in order to increase firm value (or
to entrench themselves in their positions). Then a second state, to
avoid losing revenue, should respond by introducing a further innova-
tion, causing all of the firms to migrate to it, and so forth. However,
the market for corporate charters is more stable than this. Most firms
that relocate do so only once, some never change their incorporation
state, and Delaware continues to attract the vast majority of all
reincorporations23a Accordingly, although Cary's and Winter's depic-
tion of the competitive process is intuitively appealing, it has the un-
desirable property of being a disequilibrium rather than an
equilibrium story. If we assume optimizing behavior, as Winter and
Cary assume of managers, a disequilibrium story is unsatisfactory be-
cause it implies that deals could still be made between firms and
states, and consequently, that the actors have not optimized.
Recognizing this snag in the classic exposition of the corporate
charter market, some scholars sought to refine Winter's explanation
of the value-maximizing properties of state competition. Richard
Posner and Kenneth Scott, in a short note in their corporate law
reader, hypothesized that states differentiate their products by tailor-
ular states and firms, and that prevents overnight shifts in a state's market share while simulta-
neously protecting firms' interests in a responsive corporation code.
12 See generally Y. Aharoni, The No-Risk Society 24 (1981) (public policy is the result of
an interplay of organized interest groups); M. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington
Establishment 41-49 (1977) (desire for reelection spurs congressmen to meet constituents' de-
mands for services). More important, congressmen are responsive to interest groups that are
constituency-based rather than Washington-based lobbyists. M. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legisla-
tors: A Theory of Political Markets 49-50 (1981) (citing J. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting
Decisions 145-46 (1973)).
13 Romano, supra note 1, at 244 (82% of reincorporations of publicly traded firms in the
period 1960-1980 were in Delaware). In my sample of firms, those with multiple reincorpora-
tions consisted primarily of a group of Michigan manufacturing companies that went to Dela-
ware in the 1960's and 1970's upon Delaware's revision of its corporation code, and then
moved back to Michigan in the 1980's after a change in that state's taxation. Michigan had
also revised its code to duplicate Delaware's in the interim. Id. at 258.
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ing their codes to attract different types of firms.' 4 In particular, they
suggested that Delaware specializes in providing charters for large
publicly traded firms. While this is an interesting insight, there are
serious difficulties with it. First, competition is not necessary for
product differentiation because it can be achieved within one state's
code. Many states, including Delaware, offer different rules for
smaller, closely held corporations through the enactment of close cor-
poration statutes.' 5 Second, only slightly more than one-half of the
largest firms are incorporated in Delaware. Thus, to be useful, Posner
and Scott's conjecture must be refined, as size alone is not a distin-
guishing characteristic. However, comparison tests across numerous
attributes of large public firms incorporated in Delaware and in other
states fail to show any statistically significant differences.' 6 Conse-
quently, Posner and Scott's speculation is, at best, incomplete.
While a specialization story avoids a disequilibrium result, it
does not provide the normative edge for asserting that state laws are
value-maximizing: The welfare implications of product differentia-
tion models are indeterminate, as their equilibrium need not be opti-
mal."' A product differentiation story that fits the formal economic
models of the Posner and Scott intuition accordingly does not have to
be attached to the position that state laws are in the interest of share-
holders. In fact, Barry Baysinger and Henry Butler have combined a
product differentiation explanation with pieces of both sides of the
state competition debate. 18 They begin by agreeing with Cary that
some state codes, such as Delaware's, are lax and favor managers,
while others are strict and favor shareholders. The analysis then
takes an interesting turn. Baysinger and Butler's thesis is that firms
will locate in the state whose laws match their shareholders' needs: In
particular, firms with diffuse ownership will select lax states because
these shareholders can sell their shares if management's performance
14 R. Posner & K. Scott, Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation 111
(1980). A fuller exploration of such a view of corporate charters derived from an economic
theory of federalism-Charles Tiebout's theory of local public goods in which citizens move to
the locality whose tax and spending program matches their preferences-was provided by
Frank Easterbrook. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & Econ.
23 (1983).
'5 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 342 (1984).
16 Romano, supra note 1, at 262-65. The only statistically significant differences were that
the Delaware firms have been in existence for fewer years than non-Delaware firms and that
they average more acquisitions over their shorter lives. Id. This difference can be explained by
the transaction explanation of reincorporation, see infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
17 See Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 217, 231-33 (1976).
18 Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. &
Econ. 179 (1985).
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is poor, while firms with a controlling shareholder or concentrated
ownership will choose strict states whose codes facilitate shareholder
activism because exit is costly for large shareholders.
Baysinger and Butler sought support for this self-selection thesis
by examining the ownership concentration of firms in states with
strict and lax laws. They compared the mean holdings of various
types of shareholders across firms that had remained in and firms that
had reincorporated away from four states that were classified as strict.
Rather than deriving the classification from the content of state cor-
poration codes, upon which the point of the exercise is premised, they
defined a strict state to be a state from which headquartered firms
migrate. They found that the shareholder groups' holdings were sig-
nificantly smaller in firms that had left the strict states.
Unfortunately, their definition of strictness is unsatisfactory; a
migration index of strictness is a noisy signal because some states have
larger firm populations than others, which generates some movement
independent of the relative differences in legal regimes. Although
Baysinger and Butler alleviate this problem by using percentages
rather than absolute nitmbers of firms per state, the adjusted criterion
is still an inaccurate proxy for what they want to measure. One of the
four states they identified as strict by the migration criterion, New
York, is in fact a relatively permissive state, and a number of states
with high corporate retention rates that are permissive under Bay-
singer and Butler's definition, such as South Dakota, are strict states
if we examine the actual content of their codes.' 9 This objection is not
trivial. Because the sample for testing their thesis consisted of an
equal number of firms from each of the four states they classified as
strict, the misclassification of one state renders one-quarter of the ob-
servations questionable, and we cannot be sure what effect this has on
their results.2°
More important, Baysinger and Butler's thesis is problematic be-
cause it calls for behavior that is not observed. If legal regime and
19 I have developed a measure of states' corporate law responsiveness that is a function of
both the substance and timing of enactment of corporation code provisions in order to better
examine the state competition hypothesis. See Romano, supra note 1, at 233-42. The respon-
siveness measure identifies strict and lax legal regimes more precisely than migration because it
is derived directly from the content of corporation codes.
20 An additional difficulty is that we do not know whether the variable for director and
officer holdings excludes family members who are also managers. Presumably, the tests con-
trolled for such individuals. If not, then the finding of no difference in management holdings
would be misleading. Moreover, the conclusion that strict laws are important for firms with
higher family holdings would be illusory because if family members are also managers, then
the basis for maintaining that the legal regime matters is eliminated because there is no separa-
tion of ownership and control in such firms.
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shareholder concentration are paired, as they maintain, then when a
firm is taken over and ownership becomes more concentrated, it
should move to a strict state. Yet this rarely occurs. In the cases
where we see a change of incorporation state at the same time or
shortly after a merger, the destination state is typically Delaware, the
most "lax" state.E1
In addition, reincorporation patterns raise a further question
concerning their results. Because corporations reincorporate in order
to undertake specific types of transactions for which legal rules mat-
ter,2 2 if there is a systematic relation between transaction type and
ownership concentration, this would create an omitted variable prob-
lem, weakening the power of Baysinger and Butler's test. For the
type of legal regime, strict or permissive, might actually be related to
the transaction motivating the reincorporation and not to the owner-
ship pattern. For example, when firms go public they frequently
reincorporate in Delaware.23 While this fact superficially appears to
further Baysinger and Butler's thesis because the firm moves to a lax
state as ownership becomes less concentrated, it in fact underscores a
difficulty in testing their explanation-the transaction of interest,
reincorporation when going public, coincides with a change in owner-
ship pattern, and thus confounds the test.
Moreover, it is misleading to characterize firms that have gone
public as having diffuse ownership, because even though their owner-
ship has become less concentrated when they go public, the original
owners retain, at minimum, working control. This phenomenon is
therefore an additional problem for their thesis: Since there are still
large controlling shareholders, the firm should not have moved to a
permissive state. In no case does the original owners' holding drop to
a sufficiently small number of shares such that the difficulty of selling
the stock that Baysinger and Butler posit would disappear.24 Indeed,
most of the statistically significant ownership differences in their sam-
ple, given conventional wisdom, would not significantly affect share-
21 I found this to be so in the data collected for Romano, supra note 1.
22 Id. at 250-51. See also infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing transaction
costs of reincorporation).
23 Romano, supra note 1, at 255-56.
24 It might make sense for Baysinger and Butler to emphasize absolute levels of ownership
rather than the relative measure of a difference in means test. This would eliminate the prob-
lem discussed in the text by excluding most firms that go public. But it would also weaken the
link between their thesis and state competition. In their story, it is the preferences of migrating
firms that drives the selection of corporation codes. Because going-public firms comprise the
largest group of reincorporating firms, id. at 250, 253, to be complete, any theory of state
competition must explain those decisions.
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holders' control of their firm. 25 Furthermore, the mean holding in the
leaving firms of all types of shareholders for which the difference
across firms was statistically significant is still a very substantial block
of stock. Accordingly, these investors do not have the ability to sell
shares easily in either case, casting further doubt on Baysinger and
Butler's explanation of state competition.
Given these factors, the more plausible explanation for the own-
ership pattern in conjunction with migration is not that large share-
holders necessarily prefer stricter laws, but rather that the initial legal
regime may be irrelevant to such shareholders. The corporation code
does not have the monitoring role that Baysinger and Butler ascribe
to it because for firms with controlling shareholders that move upon
going public, as well as for the average firm in their sample, it is not
very helpful to talk about the separation of ownership and control. In
short, some other feature must be driving corporations to Delaware.
While Baysinger and Butler offer an elegant twist-corporate self-se-
lection-to the state competition debate, the data do not satisfactorily
accord with their identification and explanation of the basis for self-
selection.
C. A Transaction Cost Explanation of the Market
for Corporate Charters
The feature in Cary's and Winter's analysis that implies system
instability is the assumption that there are no transaction costs of
moving. If there are costs to reincorporating, then it is less likely that
a corner solution will develop. The importance of transaction costs
enters into the product differentiation explanations that emphasize va-
riety in corporation codes. It is explicit in Posner and Scott's size
hypothesis-they suggest that only large firms can afford to relocate
in Delaware. And while it may not be crucial to Baysinger and But-
ler's thesis, they do maintain that information costs prevent firms
from choosing the most liberal state and then tailoring their charters
to meet shareholder preferences.
My explanation of the corporate charter market relies on trans-
action costs. This transaction cost explanation of state competition
has two prongs: one concerns the reasons why firms move, and the
other concerns the persistence of Delaware's extraordinary market
25 For example, the corporate ownership of "leavers" averages 11.28%, compared to
15.69% for "stayers." Baysinger & Butler, supra note 18, at 187. Yet in both situations, the
lower percentage is well within what is generally thought to be enough for working control in a
public corporation, and constitutes insider status for the purpose of the federal securities laws.
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share. The cost of migration26 must produce a commensurate benefit
for a move to be undertaken, a benefit that relates to a reduction in
the cost of operating the firm under the new regime. In addition, un-
like the product differentiation stories, my thesis predicts substantial
uniformity in state laws, in keeping with the classic positions of Cary
and Winter, as well as the more salient characteristic of corporation
codes. Under this explanation, variety in corporation codes is primar-
ily a function of diffusion-the differential in time by which innova-
tions are enacted by legislatures across the states-rather than of
different preferences across firms.27
1. Why Do Firms Reincorporate?
I expected that reincorporations would accompany changes in
business operation and organization that would be cheaper in a differ-
ent legal regime. The cost reduction could involve direct costs-for
instance, where the legal rules governing specific transactions differ
across the states, thereby imposing different costs on those transac-
tions-or it could involve indirect costs-for example, different re-
gimes affect the likelihood and cost of litigation over transactions
differently. My data on reincorporations support this contention:
Firms reincorporate when they are preparing to initiate a discrete set
of transactions, the most frequent being a public offering, a merger
and acquisition program, or defensive maneuvering against take-
overs.8 A number of legal rules that vary across the states, including
the conditions for shareholder voting and appraisal rights, affect the
cost of engaging in such activity. For instance, corporation codes
may limit merger voting and appraisal rights of the acquiring firm's
shareholders, which reduces acquisition costs. They may also regu-
late takeovers or make charter amendment flexible, reducing the cost
of resisting a bid. Finally, different organizational rules, including the
requirements for shareholder meetings, written consent and board
26 See Romano, supra note 1, at 246-49 (reincorporation costs range from a few thousand
to millions of dollars).
27 In my analysis, because most states are behaving defensively in the charter market and
differences in legal regimes are of interest to firms undertaking certain types of transactions,
firm self-selection could still be a factor in statutory variety in the following circumstance: If
no or very few firms in a state will ever undertake specific transactions for which another state
has innovated, then the former state does not have to amend its code to retain the firms in its
jurisdiction.
28 These three categories comprised 72% of the reincorporations where an associated
transaction type could be identified. Romano, supra note 1, at 250. My data consisted of
survey responses and public information on the reincorporations of several hundred industrial
corporations that were publicly traded in 1982 and had changed their incorporation state dur-
ing the 20-year period, 1962-1981. Id. at 242-43.
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communication, both ease the transition to, and reduce the cost of
operating, a newly publicly traded firm.
In addition, a common characteristic of the transactions motivat-
ing reincorporations is an increase in the likelihood that a firm will be
embroiled in litigation. Acquisitions and efforts to thwart them fre-
quently produce protracted lawsuits over the fairness of the offer or
the appropriateness of management's actions. Going public sets the
stage for potential fiduciary breaches by bringing into the firm a new
class of stockholders whose interests may differ from those of man-
ager-shareholders. In all of these situations, a legal regime that
reduces expected litigation costs is desirable. A well-developed case
law and expertise in corporate law are mechanisms by which a state
can lower those costs. Such a regime enables counsel to provide man-
agement quickly with opinion letters concerning the transactions they
wish to pursue, which facilitates business planning to circumvent
problems that could spark litigation.
Reincorporating firms' interest in finding legal regimes that re-
duce their cost of doing business is further supported by survey re-
sponses: Firms that reincorporate to undertake the transactions
mentioned earlier perceive a significant difference in the laws of the
origin and destination states and emphasize that the difference is an
important factor in their decision to move more frequently than do
other firms.29 Moreover, firms that reincorporate to pursue the iden-
tified transactions choose more frequently to relocate in the most re-
sponsive state, Delaware.3" If there is a self-selection story to be told
about state competition for corporate charters, it is more likely to be
one that matches responsive states with firms engaging in particular
types of transactions, which may or may not be correlated with share-
holder concentration, rather than firms of specified ownership struc-
tures per se.
While the transaction cost explanation of reincorporation tells us
why firms change their incorporation state, it is inconclusive concern-
ing who benefits from the move. If firms reincorporate to reduce
transaction costs, then migration is value-maximizing for sharehold-
ers by definition, because cost minimization is an inherent aspect of
equity share price maximization. However, if reincorporation merely
29 Id. at 258. The other firms moved primarily to realize tax savings. Firms that move to a
more responsive state also more frequently report a difference in origin and destination state
legal regimes and that the difference is an important factor in their decision to move. The chi-
square statistic for both crosstabulations was statistically significant, although the statistic for
the table of transaction-type by questionnaire response is not reliable because more than 20%
of the cells had very low expected frequencies. Id. at 258-60.
30 Id. at 255-56.
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reduces potential litigation costs, the direction of the effect becomes
muddied. These lawsuits involve shareholder claims, and the benefi-
ciaries of the cost reduction may therefore include managers, who are
the defendants in the suit and whose interest in this context may con-
flict with that of the shareholders. Moreover, even when the cost re-
duction consists of making a specific transaction cheaper to
undertake, the move is value-maximizing only if the transaction itself
benefits shareholders.3'
2. Why is Delaware the Destination State of Choice?
The transaction cost explanation of the corporate charter market
provides a different perspective on state competition. Delaware's per-
sistent large market share is maintained by a first-mover advantage
created by the reciprocal relation that develops between the charter-
ing state and firms due to their substantial investment in assets that
are specific to the chartering transaction. The concept of a transac-
tion specific asset, developed by Oliver Williamson, arises in an inter-
temporal context and refers to an asset that cannot be redeployed in
an alternative use at a price anywhere comparable to its value in the
original contract should that contract be disrupted.32 Contracts in-
volving such assets transform the parties' exchange relationship from
a competitive market transaction into a bilateral monopoly. A simple
example of a transaction specific asset is the specialized racks that are
used to transport finished automobiles to market. Such racks are cus-
tomized for specific car models and cannot be used to transport mod-
els of different manufacturers. As a consequence, they are valuable
only in certain transactions, and both transporter and car manufac-
turer are vulnerable and have holdup power. At the outset, there are
a number of transporters and automobile manufacturers with which
to negotiate, but once parties enter into an agreement, the manufac-
turer needs that particular hauler to get its cars to market and the
hauler needs that manufacturer to earn a return on the racks.
The key feature for analysis is that the nonredeployable character
of the asset makes the parties to a contract vulnerable and necessitates
additional institutional arrangements-which Williamson terms
"governance structures"-that reduce the possibility of exploitation
and safeguard investments in the transaction specific asset. One such
31 Some would argue that particular transactions, such as takeover defensive tactics, do not
benefit shareholders. For some discussion of this issue, see infra notes 53-57 and accompany-
ing text.
32 For a complete exposition of the theory, see 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions
of Capitalism 163-206 (1985).
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mechanism is the bilateral use of hostages-the contracting party may
place him or herself in an analogously vulnerable position to the asset
owner by giving up something of value, by posting a bond so to speak.
This action credibly guarantees his or her performance and thereby
maintains the other party's incentive to invest in the transaction spe-
cific asset.33 In cases of asset specificity, the exchange of hostages may
be a prerequisite for the transaction itself to occur.
How does this analysis apply to the corporate charter market?34
Because the transactions between a firm and its incorporation state
extend over a long period of time and reincorporation is not costless,
relocation makes a firm vulnerable to exploitation by the state. In
particular, the state may charge a premium for incorporation and
then alter its code or simply not implement the latest innovations, to
the firm's detriment, knowing that the firm cannot quickly migrate
again without incurring additional expenses. Hence, due to this non-
simultaneity in performance, a state with a favorable corporation code
must guarantee its code's continued responsiveness to be successful in
the corporate charter market.
Of all the states, Delaware is best positioned to credibly commit
itself to responsiveness. First, its very success in the incorporation
business serves, ironically, to constrain its behavior: The high propor-
tion of total revenue it derives from franchise taxes guarantees contin-
ued responsiveness because it has so much to lose. For unlike states
less dependent on franchise revenues, Delaware has no readily avail-
able alternative source to which it can turn in order to maintain ex-
penditures. It cannot afford to lose firms to other states by failing to
33 See id. The typical solution to the automobile racks example discussed in the text in-
volves informal contracting in conjunction with ownership of the racks by the carrier, rather
than a bilateral exchange of hostages; the typical solution for the shipment of automobile parts,
which also require specialized racks, is ownership by the shipper. Palay, Avoiding Regulatory
Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements, 1 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 155 (1985). Good examples of pure hostages are far too complex to be useful for the
text's pedagogic point of an illustration of a transaction specific asset. For specific examples,
see 0. Williamson, supra note 32, at 180-89, 197-203.
34 The discussion in the text sets out the thesis put forth in Romano, supra note 1, at 235-
36, 240-42, 257-60, 273-79. I state the thesis in detail for those who have not read or do not
wish to read the longer article, and for those who did not understand it. In a recent paper,
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, after citing my article for the data, state that they are
offering a new explanation of state competition in which Delaware "offers a reliable promise-
one that cannot be matched by its competitors-that its corporation law will remain highly
attractive to managers for many years into the future." Macey & Miller, Interest Groups and
Delaware Corporate Law 26 (preliminary draft 1986) (available at Cardozo Law Library).
The central insight that they are advancing as their theory of the corporate charter market is
precisely that of my earlier article.
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keep its code up-to-date. In this way, Delaware offers itself as a hos-
tage by its reliance on franchise taxes to finance its expenditures.
Second, an additional institutional mechanism warranting re-
sponsiveness is Delaware's constitutional provision mandating that all
changes in the corporation code be adopted by a two-thirds vote of
both houses of the state legislature.35 This makes it difficult to renege
on provisions already in the code and, correspondingly, on the overall
policy of being responsive to firms. While the provision would appear
to make future changes equally difficult, if firms are risk averse when
it comes to corporation codes, they might favor a maximin strategy in
which the constitutional provision would be desirable, since it helps to
ensure that the legal regime will never be worse than it is at the time
of incorporation. This provision thus complements Delaware's high
proportionate franchise tax, for while the constitution is backward-
looking, limiting radical revamping of the code, the incentives pro-
vided by the franchise tax revenue are forward-looking, as the state
reacts to the high proportion of franchise tax revenues in the past by
maintaining its responsiveness to incremental change in the future.
Third, Delaware has invested in assets that have no use outside
of the chartering business. These assets, which can best be character-
ized as legal capital, consist of a store of legal precedents forming a
comprehensive body of case law, judicial expertise in corporate law,
and administrative expertise in the rapid processing of corporate fil-
ings. These features are not as easily duplicated by other states as the
provisions of a corporation code because of the startup costs in devel-
oping expertise and the dynamic precedent-based nature of adjudica-
tion by courts.36
The combination of these factors-the high proportion of
franchise tax revenue, the constitutional supermajority requirement,
and the investments in legal capital-create an intangible asset with
hostage-like qualities, a reputation for responsiveness, 7 that firms
35 Del. Const. art. IX, § 1. Only one other state, Iowa, has such a constitutional provision.
Iowa Const. art. 8, § 12.
36 While a state could explicitly legislate the principle of statutory construction that when
it enacted a Delaware law it intended to include all of the existing judicial interpretations, see,
e.g., Wilmington City Ry. v. People's Ry., 47 A. 245, 251 (Del. Ch. 1900), this would not
protect firms concerning future adjudicative issues. The state would have to bind its courts to
follow future Delaware precedents, and hope that no case of first impression decided by its
own courts would conflict with a subsequent Delaware decision. Such a system would involve
overwhelming problems of constitutional delegation and parties' rights of appeal, in addition
to problems concerning the coherency of local decisional law and the granting of retroactive
relief should the hypothesized conflict arise.
37 The connection between reputations and hostages is straightforward: In the corporate
charter market where both firms and states have potentially infinite lives, the party with the
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weigh in their incorporation decision. The large number of firms al-
ready incorporated in Delaware further solidifies its commanding po-
sition in the market by giving it a first-mover advantage. There is
safety in numbers-the more firms there are the higher the level of
franchise tax paid and the more the state relies on its incorporation
business for revenue, which provides the incentive to behave respon-
sively. In addition, the large number of firms makes it more likely
that any particular issue will be litigated and decided in Delaware,
providing a sound basis for corporate planning. This attracts even
more firms for the more responsive a state and the more settled its
law, the cheaper it is for a firm to operate under that legal regime.
The first-mover advantage is self-sustaining because the more firms
there are paying a franchise tax, the greater the return Delaware earns
on its reputation for responsiveness, and the stronger its incentive to
not engage in an endgame strategy of exploiting firms that would
damage, if not destroy, its investment in a reputation.
This brings us to the demand side of the market, which also aids
Delaware in maintaining an edge. There is a third party affected by
the incorporation system, legal counsel, and the features of Dela-
ware's legal regime that are attractive to firms-a well-developed case
law with a pool of handy precedents and a means for rapidly ob-
taining a legal opinion on any issue-are also advantageous to corpo-
rate lawyers. For these features of Delaware law lower the cost of
furnishing advice to clients. This is especially important for outside
counsel, who service firms that are headquartered in different states,
and who are instrumental in choosing the incorporation state.38 They
realize cost savings by having clients operate under one legal regime.
In addition to encouraging the choice of Delaware as the incorpora-
tion site for clients, specialization also provides an incentive for advis-
ing firms to remain in Delaware, because moving will diminish the
attorney's human capital. Counsel's desire to recoup the investment
in mastery of the institutional detail of Delaware law ties firms recip-
rocally to Delaware, just as Delaware is tied to firms.
Human capital is important in another way. Delaware's stake in
reputation, Delaware, has an incentive to maintain it because the costs of building up its repu-
tation will not be recouped if it behaves irresponsively in the short run. For then domestic
firms will relocate, new firms will not migrate to it, and tax revenues in later periods will be
lost. In other words, a cooperative equilibrium can emerge from a "tit-for-tat" strategy. See
generally R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (reciprocity strategies are self-
reinforcing and powerful tools to create cooperation).
38 Romano, supra note 1, at 274-76. Macey and Miller question these results, stating that
"the questionnaire . . . used did not list investment banks as potential parties to suggest
reincorporation." Macey & Miller, supra note 34, at 25. The questionnaire included invest-
ment bankers as an explicit choice; the respondents did not choose that answer.
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the chartering business exceeds the revenues it receives from the
franchise tax. A number of its citizens specialize in providing services
to nonresident Delaware corporations. Accordingly, it is in the inter-
est of those individuals that Delaware be responsive to corporations
so that the demand for their services does not decline.39 Delaware's
supermajority constitutional provision therefore serves an important
function aside from credibly precommiting it to be responsive to
firms: It protects the value of these individuals' personal investments
by making it more difficult for a political realignment in the state to
alter the longstanding course of corporate responsiveness.
This transaction specific human capital, which creates a "mutual
reliance relation"40 between firms and Delaware, joins the parties in
long-term cooperation because of their reciprocal vulnerability, and
cements Delaware's market position, as it makes it difficult for a rival
state to compete successfully. Another state cannot simply offer cor-
porations the same code at a lower price and attract the marginal
firm, because a switch would increase operating and legal costs, and
more importantly, the state cannot provide a credible commitment of
superior service. In particular, a rival state cannot place itself in the
same vulnerable position as Delaware because it starts from a low
franchise tax ratio and has not yet invested in legal capital.4 In order
for a state to begin to compete, a significant number of firms would
39 Romano, supra note 1, at 276-77. A number of years ago, Joe Bishop made the point
concerning the importance of lawyers in Delaware's lack of a security-for-expenses require-
ment for shareholder derivative suits. He wrote: "It might ... occur to a cynical mind that
this curious anomaly of the Delaware law may not be wholly unconnected with the fact that
the prosecution or defense of a derivative suit in a Delaware court requires the retention of
Delaware counsel." Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and
Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. Law. 92, 94-95 (1966). Macey and Miller, supra note 34, also stress
the importance of lawyers in Delaware. They appear to suggest that the input of lawyers in
Delaware's legislative process has negative implications for a theory of state competition. Such
a conclusion would be wrong-the role of lawyers is peripheral to the debate, particularly from
the transaction cost view of state competition that they appear to be advancing. If Delaware
passed corporate laws that systematically favor lawyers to the detriment of firms on a large
scale, it would lose its chartering business to another state whose lawyers were not as avari-
cious. Delaware maintains its position by mutual cooperation with, and not by exploitation of,
firms. This is not to say that lawyers do not profit in Delaware. While lawyers are actively
and intimately involved in Delaware's profitable chartering business, their participation pro-
vides no clear-cut insight concerning whether it benefits managers at the shareholders' ex-
pense. The important question, which Macey and Miller do not address, is how any rents are
divided between Delaware, the bar, and firms.
40 The term is from Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 528 (1983).
41 Nevada, one of two states to experience a net immigration of corporations in the period
1960-1980, Romano, supra note 1, at 246, has sought to compete for corporate charters. It has
been styled the "Delaware of the West," yet it has failed in its quest for a commanding share of
the market.
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have to agree to move to it in concert. But there is no incentive for
corporations to move to another state so long as Delaware continues
to cooperate, and there are powerful incentives for Delaware to con-
tinue to do so.
II. TAKEOVER STATUTES: ANOMALY OR EXEMPLAR?
More than most provisions in corporation codes that are the
technical terrain upon which the state competition debate is fought,
state takeover statutes are a source of substantial controversy. The
statutes were enacted in two waves. The first generation statutes,
which spread rapidly across states in the 1970's, directly regulated
tender offers by establishing waiting periods and administrative hear-
ing requirements for bids for target firms that often had dubious juris-
dictional contacts with the legislating state. After the Supreme Court
held in 1982, in Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,42 that Illinois' statute burdened
interstate commerce, new statutes with more plausible jurisdictional
bases were devised.
The new statutes have three major forms: (1) control share acqui-
sition statutes that require acquisitions of stock that constitute con-
trol, or the voting rights of such shares, to be approved by a majority
vote of disinterested shareholders,43 (2) fair price statutes that require
either a supermajority shareholder vote, disinterested board approval,
or payment of a fair price for the second step of a two-tier acquisi-
tion,' and (3) redemption rights statutes that give all shareholders
cash redemption rights against any acquirer of at least thirty percent
of the firm's stock.45 The fair price provision is the most popular of
the three, having been enacted by fourteen of the twenty-one states to
adopt second generation statutes.46 All three types of takeover stat-
utes can raise the price of an acquisition, although unlike the first
42 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
43 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985). Control share acquisition stat-
utes have recently been held unconstitutional in several states. E.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v.
Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1986), appeal granted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986), Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161
(D. Ha. 1986).
44 E.g., Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. § 3-602 (1985). New York recently passed a more
restrictive fair price statute that bans a second-step combination for five years after the first
step, with limited exceptions. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney 1986). Its version ap-
pears to have replaced Maryland's as the model for states adopting fair price provisions. See,
e.g., 1986 N.J. Sess. Laws Serv. ch. 74 (West).
45 E.g., 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
46 Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111, 117-18
(1987). Only three states adopted a redemption rights provision and six chose control share
acquisition statutes, of which two also enacted a fair price provision. For a discussion of why
the fair price statute is the most popular, see id. at 117-20, 168-70.
1987]
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo L. Rev.  725 1986-1987
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
generation statutes, they codify tactics that firms could undertake by
self-help through charter provisions and permit firms to opt out of the
legislation's coverage. Their potential to discourage unfriendly acqui-
sitions is, of course, what gives them bite, and, correspondingly, what
makes them controversial.
Takeover statutes are of particular interest because they generate
a puzzle for the state competition literature. Some commentators
who contend that state competition produces laws that benefit share-
holders have also maintained that mechanisms which facilitate man-
agement's efforts to thwart hostile bids, such as the actions codified by
takeover statutes, are not in the shareholders' interest and should be
banned.47 The difficulty for this position is that many firms choose
their incorporation state to facilitate defensive maneuvering against
takeovers. To be consistent, it would seem that the commentators
must argue either that state competition is managerialist, or that de-
fensive tactics are beneficial to shareholders.48
A. The Politics of a Takeover Statute
I set out to explore this apparent inconsistency in the literature
concerning the effects on shareholder welfare of state competition and
takeover defensive tactics by examining the politics behind the adop-
tion of a second generation takeover statute.49 My initial hypothesis,
which was sparked by newspaper accounts, was that corporation code
provisions might be differentiated as value-maximizing or managerial-
ist, by who lobbied for their passage. In particular, if takeover laws
were supported by a coalition of labor, local community leaders, and
managers, it would support a managerialist explanation. Namely,
managers would be better positioned to have enacted a law adverse to
shareholders' interests when they could appeal for support to a broad-
based constituency that had no particular interest in the everyday
technicalities of corporation codes. I expected to find that takeover
47 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 35 (state competition benefits shareholders); Fischel,
The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Cor-
poration Law, 76 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 913, 943-44 (1982) (same); Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1161, 1165-82 (1981) (defensive tactics harm shareholders).
48 Ralph Winter distinguished state takeover laws from state competition over corporation
codes because of takeover laws' extraterritorial effect-the first generation statutes applied to
more than domestically incorporated firms. Winter, supra note 2, at 268. He maintained that
this enabled the states to restrain competition for charters. Id. at 287-89. The second genera-
tion statutes, however, have a narrower jurisdiction and thereby lack the external effects with
which he was concerned, for they apply only to domestically incorporated firms. Therefore,
they cannot be so readily differentiated from other corporation laws.
49 The discussion that follows is from Romano, supra note 46, at 122-41.
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laws would be aberrational in their politics and, hence, sharply distin-
guishable from other provisions in corporation codes.
The hunch was wrong. In Connecticut, the passage of a fair
price statute was of moment only to the business community. A ma-
jor corporation in the state promoted the bill with the aid of a trade
group similar to a state chamber of commerce." The only other
group interested in the legislation was the executive committee of the
corporate law section of the state bar association. The bar group op-
posed the statute, largely on procedural grounds; they had not been
consulted and thought that such a statute should be scrutinized more
carefully before enactment.51
Apart from the statute's quirky procedural status and conse-
quent bar opposition, the experiences of other states are very similar
to that of Connecticut: The only groups who are active in the enact-
ment of second generation takeover statutes are business organiza-
tions and the bar. The statutes proceed through state legislatures at
an extraordinarily rapid pace, with virtually unanimous bipartisan
support, at the behest of the local business community and, most fre-
quently, one concerned firm. This data supports what I term a put-
ting-out-fires explanation of the enactment of takeover legislation, in
which legislators simply react to a constituent's immediate concrete
demands. To mitigate the problem of sampling error from relying on
a case study, I also performed several statistical analyses to see which
explanation-the coalition or the putting-out-fires explanation-best
predicts which states adopt second generation statutes. Regressions
including predictor variables that represented both theses, as well as
economic variables indicating a state's prosperity, were estimated.
But the results were inconclusive; the estimations offered some sup-
port for both explanations. 52 I prefer the putting-out-fires explanation
50 There was no opposition within the business community to the firm's proposal: The
number of firms affected by the statute was small-a substantial number of the publicly traded
firms had similar provisions in their charters and there are few acquiring companies in Con-
necticut. Moreover, the statute would matter to those acquirers only if they wanted to acquire
other Connecticut firms.
51 Unlike the enactment of most other Connecticut corporate law provisions, the corporate
bar was not consulted about the fair price statute and learned of it only after it was about to be
approved by the state senate. The limited opportunity for involvement by the corporate bar in
the legislation was connected to the peculiar procedural posture of the bill-having missed or
waited until after the session's filing deadline, the fair price statute's sponsors had it attached
as an amendment to an inconsequential bill providing for changes in corporate names. This
procedure made it possible to bypass the requirement of a public hearing on the fair price
statute. Romano, supra note 46, at 122-28.
52 The estimated equations were significant, explaining approximately 40% of the variation
across the states of statute adoption, and having a statute was positively related to union mem-
bership and negatively related to the presence of domestic hostile bidder firms. Id. at 142-45.
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to the coalition hypothesis because it is supported by both anecdotal
accounts and statistical data.
B. When Should We Question Takeover Statutes?
While the micro explanation of the political process identified the
parties involved in the legislation, it did not provide much evidence
for resolving the issue motivating the study: Whom do takeover stat-
utes benefit? I therefore returned to first principles by trying to deter-
mine when shareholders would voluntarily adopt as a charter
provision the requirements that the second generation statutes codify,
for if we had a plausible explanation of which firms voluntarily adopt
shark repellent amendments, we would be better able to assess how
legislation incorporating such provisions impacts on firms, and
whether managers promoting the statutes were acting in their share-
holders' interest.
To study the incentive effects of the different provisions that the
statutes codify, I examined the shareholder's decision problem in the
takeover context-whether or not to tender-using a decision tree
analysis that incorporates the findings of empirical research on take-
overs.53 The analysis indicates under what conditions the provisions
encourage shareholders not to tender their shares in the hope of re-
ceiving a higher price later. I then add to the analysis two important
institutional details which aid in explaining why not all firms adopt
shark repellent amendments: the typical multistage techniques bid-
ders employ to obtain control, and the systematic differences across
investors in information costs. The confluence of these factors creates
a disproportionate sharing of takeover premiums in multistage offers
across shareholders, with better-informed investors typically receiving
the greater share. In the takeover situation, therefore, in contrast
with the norm for corporate law, shareholders' interests may differ
53 The discussion that follows summarizes the conclusions in id. at 145-87. The analysis
suggested why fair price provisions are more popular in charters and statutes than are control
share acquisition or redemption rights rules. The latter two statutes consist of separate fea-
tures that are combined in a fair price provision, supermajority approval, and equal premium
payments, respectively. These statutes thus offer acquiring firms fewer options for the struc-
turing of an acquisitive transaction than does a fair price statute. As a result, a fair price
statute introduces fewer barriers to an acquisition. In addition, target shareholders' decisions
to tender or not vary under the three takeover rules, such that only under a fair price regime is
there a decision strategy in which the investor sometimes tenders and sometimes does not.
These two factors suggest that shareholders approving shark repellent amendments could be
rationally trading off a decrease in the probability of receiving an initial bid against an increase
in the certainty of receiving an equal share of the bid premium. For the most frequently
chosen tactic, a fair price provision, has the smallest impact on the likelihood of initial bids
while at the same time, by providing an incentive to not tender in some cases, retains the
possibility of receiving a higher premium.
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markedly. Consequently, views on the welfare-enhancing properties
of shark repellent provisions may not be uniform across the common-
stock class. In particular, because provisions such as a fair price re-
quirement enable small investors to realize information cost savings
by equalizing bid prices, small shareholders should tend to favor the
adoption of such provisions while large institutional and individual
investors, whose costs in obtaining information are lower and enable
them to benefit from a disproportionate premium structure, should
not. A firm's voluntary adoption of an antitakeover provision would
correspondingly be dependent upon its ownership concentration. 4
The corollary of an ownership-composition explanation of shark
repellent amendments is that the impact of a statute will differ across
firms, and, accordingly, can become quite problematic. For example,
it could be a means for managers to circumvent shareholders where a
favorable charter amendment vote would be doubtful. Given that
management can place a proposal on the agenda with less difficulty
than can a shareholder, this troubling possibility could be mitigated
by opt-in rather than opt-out regimes." But opting in also has disad-
vantages: Because a vote is still required, it negates much of the trans-
action cost savings of a statute for those corporations whose
shareholders would approve a charter provision.
I sought to test whether ownership concentration would be an
accurate predictor of firms with shark repellent amendments by com-
paring concentration measures for firms with and without fair price
provisions. None of the differences were statistically significant. I
also divided the firms in the sample by incorporation state, based on
54 Barry Baysinger and Henry Butler maintain that support for shark repellent provisions
comes from shareholders who have special relations with firm management such that their
shares would be worth less under new management and are worth more to them than the
premium paid by an outsider. Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial
Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1257 (1985).
They further contend that this stock relation, which they view as a transaction specific asset, is
independent of the size of the holding. Id. at 1284-88. They do not connect their thesis con-
cerning firms' choice of incorporation state, see supra text accompanying notes 18-25, and
firms' adoption of shark repellent amendments, although the two choices are related because
firms often choose their incorporation state to facilitate adopting such measures, as well as to
be protected by a takeover statute. Even if we assume that the concept of transaction specific
stock is sensible (and I have serious doubts about this that cannot be pursued in this paper
without going off on an unrelated tangent), an analysis of the effects of the most popular shark
repellent amendments indicates the problem with the thesis: These provisions do not unam-
biguously favor shareholders with special relations to managers, unless they are the managers
themselves. See Romano, supra note 46, at 170-87. Moreover, if certain shareholders have
special relations with management that were beneficial to all shareholders of the firm, then we
need an explanation for why those relations would not be continued by new management.
55 Only a few states have opt-in rather than opt-out provisions. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 14-
2-235(a) (Supp. 1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.167 (West Supp. 1987).
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whether or not they had a second generation statute, and compared
the concentration levels for those with and without fair price provi-
sions within the subgroups separately. The concentration ratios dif-
fered significantly across the states, with the concentration ratios
being lower in states with second generation statutes. 6 This appears
to support a transaction-cost-reducing view of the statutes-states
that have enacted the legislation have more firms with diffuse owner-
ship, which are the firms, under my conjecture, whose shareholders
would approve such provisions. But in an equal-sized sample, the dif-
ference was not significant. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence in
support of the opposite proposition: The firm that promoted the Con-
necticut legislation has a relatively high concentration ratio which, in
keeping with the ownership composition thesis, suggests that its man-
agement might have had difficulty obtaining shareholder approval. 57
These two pieces of information are not, however, necessarily incon-
sistent: Takeover statutes may be promoted by managers who fear a
negative shareholder vote, while the rest of the local business commu-
nity does not object to the proposal because their shareholders would
voluntarily adopt a provision.
The impact of takeover statutes remains, then, a troubling, open
question, as some firms can use a statute to undermine the share-
holder sovereignty on which corporation law is premised. In this
sense, the Connecticut experience suggests that state chartering may
not always be an unmitigated good. Yet it also implies a positive as-
sessment of Delaware's role in the corporate charter market. Dela-
ware has yet to enact a second generation statute. In fact, it was slow
to enact a first generation statute, and the one it adopted was not as
hostile to bids as other states' versions because there was no hearing
requirement and firms could opt out of its coverage. This is not coin-
cidental: Delaware is better able to resist political pressure for take-
over laws because of the large number of incorporated firms, which
56 Romano, supra note 46, at 179. As a conceptual matter, concentration measures have
no strict implication for the enactment of statutes because firms with diffuse ownership, which
could presumably adopt such provisions on their own, might want a law to reduce drafting
costs, yet, managers of firms with concentrated ownership might also want a law because they
cannot employ voluntary solutions. If enactment of takeover statutes evinces a permissive
state, then this data supports Baysinger and Butler's pairing of more diffusely owned firms and
lax jurisdictions, see supra text accompanying notes 18-25. But when I used a random sample
with an equal number of firms in each subset to provide a more powerful test of the difference
of means, as Baysinger and Butler used for their analysis, the difference in shareholder concen-
tration across the states was not significant.
57 The sponsoring firm was also doing poorly at the time, and shortly after the statute's
passage there was a change in top management.
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includes both acquirers and targets." Delaware legislators have to be
responsive to a corporate constituency whose interests are varied and
conflicting. In addition, other interested parties who oppose restrict-
ing takeovers, such as financial intermediaries, would find it more
worthwhile to lobby in Delaware than in other states because its stat-
ute would have a greater impact on acquisitions, as it would apply to
so many firms. Consequently, it is unlikely that any one firm could
have the political clout in Delaware that individual firms display in
other states like Connecticut, in having second generation statutes en-
acted. 9 As a result, we can expect a different political equilibrium in
Delaware than in other states when it comes to takeover defenses, in
which target firms rely on self-help and shareholder approval rather
than on a mandated statutory solution.
III. EVENT STUDIES AS ARBITERS OF THE DEBATE
The debate over the efficacy of state corporation codes essentially
boils down to an empirically testable hypothesis: whether managers
or shareholders benefit from the market for corporate charters. If we
could identify the beneficiaries, then fashioning a political consensus
regarding the optimal level of government regulation would be
straightforward.60 The best available means of generating informa-
tion bearing on this issue is to examine the impact of reincorporations
on stock prices, for a change in equity value conveys investors' assess-
ment of the event's 61 expected effect on shareholder wealth. A stock
58 The second generation statutes create an externality, though of a different sort described
by Winter's analysis of first generation statutes, see supra note 48. States like Connecticut may
be benefitting local target firms at the expense of nonresident acquiring firms.
59 There is very little research, although there is need for some, on the modern political
history of Delaware. Some have contended that the DuPont family and their corporation run
the state, see J. Phelan & R. Pozen, The Company State 113-32 (1973), but that claim is
disputed, and viewed with skepticism by local historians, see, e.g., C. Hoffecker, Corporate
Capital: Wilmington in the Twentieth Century 260-61 (1983).
60 Of course, the issue may be resolvable only in theory: Limitations of data and statistical
techniques may render an answer impossible. Moreover, an analyst's priors will affect the
weight he or she attributes to empirical findings, which may result in an exceedingly slow
updating of beliefs that hinders the development of a consensus on policy.
61 An "event" can be technically defined as a change in the information set about firms
from which price expectations are formed. An event's effect can be isolated from the effects of
other factors that influence the market by standard econometric techniques. The regressions
typically employ a version of the capital asset pricing model of security valuation. That model
asserts that there is a positive linear relation between an asset's risk and return, and in particu-
lar, that the risk premium varies in direct proportion to the stock's sensitivity to market move-
ments, which is referred to as the stock's beta. Betas estimated from stock prices in a period
prior to the event are used to predict stock prices at the time of the event. The regression
residuals, which are the difference between the predicted prices and observed prices, measure
abnormal returns that can be attributed to the event. Event studies are therefore tests of semi-
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price increase upon a firm's reincorporation would mean that inves-
tors expect the change in incorporation state to increase the firm's
future cash flows, and from this it could be concluded that sharehold-
ers benefit from a move. Similarly, a decline in stock price would
indicate the anticipation that shareholder welfare will be diminished
by the move and confirm the managerialist position.
Several event studies have been performed that bear on the state
competition debate. Researchers have addressed the issue directly by
investigating the impact of reincorporating, and indirectly by looking
at the effect of state court decisions and state takeover laws. The re-
sults are summarized in Table One. None of the studies support the
managerialist position, for none found a negative effect on stock price.
Rather, to the extent they can be used to buttress any position, it is
the value-maximizing view associated with Ralph Winter.
A. Event Studies on State Competition
Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich, in the first empirical study
concerning state competition, found statistically significant positive
abnormal returns to the stock of reincorporating firms over the two-
year period preceding the reincorporation.62 The returns around the
event date were not, however, significant. While this finding under-
mines Cary's position, it is difficult to assert that it bolsters Winter's
view, because the period of abnormal returns is so far before the an-
nouncement of the move that it is possible the abnormal returns are
due to some other factor affecting the firms.
I sought to refine the Dodd and Leftwich study by partitioning
the portfolio of reincorporating firms according to the reasons for
which the reincorporation was undertaken, and by using daily rather
than monthly stock price data.63 I found that firms which reincorpo-
strong-form market efficiency-the hypothesis that all publicly available information is re-
flected in stock prices and changes in the information set are instantaneously reflected in price
adjustments. To ensure that only the effect of the event of interest is being measured, a portfo-
lio of firms that have experienced the event is created and the average residual of the group is
studied. In addition, when there is uncertainty over the precise date of the event-that is, the
day on which the information that is conveyed by the event became publicly available in the
market-the average residuals are cumulated over an interval in event time and the relevant
datum is the cumulative abnormal return. When event dates are well-specified, the methodol-
ogy is very accurate. See Brown & Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event
Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1985) [hereinafter Brown & Warner II]; Brown & Warner, Mea-
suring Security Price Performance, 8 J. Fin. Econ. 205 (1980).
62 Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" ver-
sus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 274-75 (1980).
63 Romano, supra note 1, at 265-73. Tests relying on daily data are more accurate than
those using monthly data, as daily data allow for more precise identification of events, assum-
ing the event date is accurately specified. Brown & Warner II, supra note 61, at 12.
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Table One. Research Findings on State Competition
Study
1. Dodd and Leftwich
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rated in order to embark on merger-and-acquisition programs, as well
as the aggregate portfolio of reincorporating firms, experienced statis-
tically significant positive abnormal returns on and around the event
date. The signs of the cumulative average residuals for the other
groups were also positive, although they were not significant.' This
finding creates further difficulty for the Cary thesis, and provides
more clear-cut support for Winter's value-maximizing interpretation
of state competition. Elliot Weiss and Lawrence White challenge my
conclusion and assert that the abnormal returns are not due to rein-
corporating because they begin to accrue prior to the event date.65
Weiss and White are mistaken. Although, as I stated in that article,
the positive revaluation of the firm's stock may be generated by the
activity associated with the reincorporation rather than the
64 1 had expected to find a negative effect on the stock of firms that had reincorporated for
antitakeover purposes, but none could be detected. This provided further evidence of the in-
consistency in some commentators' positions on state competition and takeover defensive tac-
tics, see supra text accompanying note 47, and spurred me to investigate the politics behind
state takeover laws as a possible explanation.
65 See infra note 66.
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reincorporation itself, the rise in price that occurred in the months
preceding the event date is almost surely caused by leakage concern-
ing the plan to reincorporate and engage in the associated activities
rather than any other unrelated events, because all firms that were the
subject of any report in the Wall Street Journal in the two months
preceding and one month following their event dates were excluded
from the sample.
Weiss and White examined another theme in the literature to get
at the crux of the state competition debate: Who is helped out by
Delaware court decisions?66 They investigated the effect of seven Del-
aware opinions that they characterized as reversals or departures
from existing corporate law rules. They hypothesized that if the deci-
sions benefited shareholders, firms would experience abnormal posi-
tive returns, and if not, there would be negative returns. They found
no statistically significant abnormal returns earned by Delaware
firms, and the signs of the residuals were not consistent with any par-
ticular thesis.67
As a further test of the state competition debate, Weiss and
White sought to explain the relative size of the cumulative average
residuals for one of the decisions--Singer v. Magnavox Co. 6 -by ex-
amining the firms' likelihood of being taken over. They put forth two
alternative scenarios: If the decision was detrimental to shareholders
because it discouraged takeovers, companies that are more likely to be
targets would have larger negative residuals, and if the decision was
favorable to investors because it decreased the likelihood of an ex-
ploitative cash-out, companies that are more likely to be taken over
would have larger positive residuals. This is their more interesting
66 E. Weiss & L. White, Of Economics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reac-
tions to "Changes" in Corporate Law (draft October 14, 1986) (available at Cardozo Law
Library).
67 Because Delaware firms make up a large segment of the market, and thus may invalidate
the abnormal returns methodology, they also examined the effects of the decisions on a portfo-
lio of non-Delaware firms. Again, the results were largely statistically insignificant, and the
signs of the residuals were not always the opposite of the signs of the residuals of the Delaware
firms, as they had hypothesized. Id. at 47-58. I do not believe, however, that this technique
deals adequately with the problem. To the extent that state competition tends to produce
uniformity in corporation codes, then corporate law rules embodied in court decisions will be
contributing to systematic risk and not unsystematic risk, and therefore will not be picked up
as an abnormal return for either set of firms. Weiss and White recognize this possibility as an
interpretation of their finding of no statistical significance but then reject it as unrealistic with-
out any convincing reason. Id. at 64.
68 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The decision affected the rights of dissenters in cash-out
mergers. Because we do not have very good theories for predicting which firms will become
targets, an interesting ad hoc test would be to examine the residuals of firms that subsequently
were acquired.
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test because most of the judicial opinions are of concern only to a
subset of firms-potential targets-and hence, in a randomly con-
structed portfolio of Delaware firms, only some of the firms would fit
this category. Any effect of the event on those firms could be over-
whelmed by the insignificant effect of the event on the aggregated
portfolio. The regression failed, however, to explain much of the vari-
ation in the residuals: Only one of the characteristics of targets that
they identified-firm growth-was significant.
Weiss and White conclude from the failure to find abnormal re-
turns and the lack of explanatory power of their regression of the
residuals on target characteristics, that investors do not believe that
changes in corporate law affect stock value and that, correspondingly,
investors are not concerned about differences in statutory regimes. As
a result, they maintain that there is no state competition to speak of.
Their study makes an important contribution to our understanding of
the impact of certain court decisions, but the implications they derive
for the state competition thesis from their data are questionable. In
the first place, a plausible alternative interpretation of the data is that
investors anticipate Delaware court decisions better than do research-
ers.69 Indeed, they provide no persuasive evidence that the corporate
bar was taken by complete surprise by the decisions. A complemen-
tary explanation is that it is likely that shareholders anticipate that
the state legislature will reverse any undesirable decision. For exam-
ple, Delaware recently revised its code to allow firms to limit outside
directors' liability.70 This move is presumably a reaction to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,7 1 which held
outside directors liable for accepting too hastily an acquisitive offer.
In addition, given the complexity of corporate acquisitions, many of
the decisions in the study could have offsetting positive and negative
effects on shareholder welfare, which could result in insignificant
residuals. Weiss and White's uncertainty as to the impact of Singer
and the fact that a firm that is the acquirer in one transaction may be
the target in another, are instances of the complexity of the effects
that need to be sorted out.
Although some participants in the state competition debate have
69 If we adopt a strong rational expectations view of the market, then we would also not
predict any reaction to court decisions because, as investors expect all decisions to have only
welfare enhancing (or diminishing) effects, all of the value of those decisions would be im-
pounded in the stock price at the time of incorporation or reincorporation in Delaware.
70 Act of June 18, 1986, ch. 289, 65 Del. Laws §§ 1, 2 (codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1987)).
71 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). For a critique of the decision, see Fischel, The Business
Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. Law. 1437 (1985).
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emphasized the role of the Delaware judiciary in furthering the state's
market position while disputing who has benefited from state law doc-
trine,72 there is another important role for courts, with sharply differ-
ent implications. One factor that transaction cost economics
emphasizes is that reducing uncertainty reduces the cost of doing
business. Hence, certainty concerning the structuring of a transaction
is valuable. One of the benefits stressed by firms reincorporating in
Delaware was its pool of precedents, and the corresponding ability to
receive opinion letters on contemplated transactions quickly. In this
regard, the substantive content of the rule is less important than hav-
ing a rule. A rule defines the rights of the parties, enabling them to
bargain around it if they so wish, and provides guidance as to how a
transaction should be structured if liability is to be avoided. This fea-
ture permeates corporate law: corporation codes are enabling statutes
that set presumptions to govern specific issues and allow firms to tai-
lor their internal organization around the rule. Indeed, the costs of
particular rules could be offset by the benefits of having a rule around
which future transactions can be planned. Thus, from the transaction
cost perspective, it is not surprising that the market did not react to
the decisions in any systematic way, and the statistical insignificance
would not indicate that being subject to Delaware's legal regime is
detrimental to shareholders.
In addition, Weiss and White's findings must be interpreted with
caution. Besides the obvious fact that, given the standard understand-
ing of statistical techniques, a failure to find significance does not pro-
vide evidence supporting the alternative hypothesis (such as the Cary
position that Weiss and White prefer to the Winter position), their
conclusion is built upon a description of the evolution of corporate
law rules produced by court decisions over time that is inconsistent
with the methodology they applied. Courts are depicted as engaging
in a balancing process that continually adjusts and reconciles the in-
terests of shareholders and managers, in which no one decision can be
evaluated separately. Such a story is most in keeping with an expla-
nation that Weiss and White reject, that the event study methodology
is inappropriate for determining the effect of court decisions, rather
than the position that there is no such thing as state competition. If
judicial decisionmaking is the perpetual adjustment process they de-
72 Compare Cary, supra note 3, at 670 (Delaware courts create a "favorable climate" for
management to further its own interests at the expense of shareholders' interests) and Fischel,
supra note 72 (criticizing certain Delaware decisions for decreasing firm value) with Fischel,
supra note 47, at 943 (shareholders benefit by recent Delaware decisions) and Winter, supra
note 2, at 260-61 (decisions which seem to favor management are not necessarily unfair to
shareholders).
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scribe, it does not consist of discrete events.73 Event studies do not-
and cannot-evaluate the effects of evolutionary processes. The
methodology presupposes information of a lump-sum nature that is
introduced in the market instantaneously with a single event, and its
accuracy is a function of the correct specification of an event date.
Thus, given their characterization of the judicial process, their study
can provide no information on the crucial issue of who benefits from
state competition, nor can they draw any conclusion concerning the
process of, or investors' attitudes toward, state competition.
B. Studies on the Effect of Takeover Statutes
Research on first generation takeover statutes has produced uni-
form findings, although only one of the two empirical studies on this
topic sought to relate the findings to the state competition debate.
Gregg Jarrell and Michael Bradley, and Margaret Guerin-Calvert,
Robert McGuckin, and Frederick Warren-Boulton (the "Economic
Analysis Group"), using both cumulative average residual techniques
to estimate bid premiums and actual bid prices, found that the premi-
ums received by target firms in states with takeover statutes were sig-
nificantly higher than those received by firms in states without
regulation. 74 There is variation in the studies' findings on whether
state regulation reduces the number of acquisitions. The Economic
Analysis Group found no clear evidence that the proportion of suc-
cessful takeovers declined as a result of regulation. In contrast, Jar-
rell and Bradley found that the relative frequency of successful cash
tender offers for firms in states with statutes declined after the legisla-
tion was enacted. Of course, none of these results resolve the state
competition debate. At best, they point to a possible trade off of pre-
mium size against initiation of bids, which makes it difficult to deci-
pher whether shareholders are losers or gainers under these laws.
The Economic Analysis Group did, however, relate their re-
73 This is also true if legislatures systematically overturn judicial opinions.
74 Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & Econ. 371 (1980); M. Guerin-Calvert, R. McGuckin & F. Warren-
Boulton, State and Federal Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control, Economic Analy-
sis Group Discussion Paper 86-4, Antitrust Div., Justice Dep't (Jan. 21, 1986) [hereinafter
Economic Analysis Group]. Jarrell and Bradley also found that acquirers of firms in states
with statutes purchased a higher percentage of shares, and the Economic Analysis Group
found that targets in states with statutes were more frequently the subject of multiple bids. In
this regard, it would be useful to remove the multiple-bid firms from the sample to see how
much of the difference in premiums across states is due to actual auctions rather than the effect
of statutes alone. However, it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of statutes and auc-
tions, because bidders, knowing that the statutes make auctions more probable, may raise their
initial bids to make competition less likely.
1987]
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo L. Rev.  737 1986-1987
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
search directly to the incorporation debate. Jarrell and Bradley ap-
pear to have restricted their identification of regulated firms to those
whose incorporation state had a takeover statute, thereby possibly
misclassifying some targets whose bids were, in fact, subject to regula-
tion. The Economic Analysis Group included and distinguished
targets by their susceptibility to both place of business and charter
regulation. They found that when they partitioned their sample of
regulated targets by type of jurisdiction, the dummy variable for juris-
dictional type was significant. They had hypothesized that this would
be so, because they believed that regulation based on a firm's physical
location more clearly constitutes a negative externality than regula-
tion by incorporation state, since moving assets is more costly than
moving a charter. They concluded that place-of-business regulation
might be the most important component of the significant effects of
state regulation on bid premiums in the estimations in which no juris-
dictional variable was included.
Second generation statutes are only of the incorporation state ju-
risdictional variety, and thus, examination of their effect might shed
more light on the Economic Analysis Group's work. I studied the
effect on stock prices of each type of second generation statute, rather
than their impact on bid premiums. 75 Because most second genera-
tion statutes are passed quickly, with little debate and virtual unanim-
ity, they are better suited than most laws for an event study in which
pinpointing the event date is crucial to the power of the statistical
tests. The statutes I examined were those adopted by Connecticut
(fair price provision); Missouri (control share acquisition statute);
and Pennsylvania (redemption rights provision). All of these states
enacted the legislation within a month or so after their bills' introduc-
tion, and are thus good candidates for an event study.76
No effects were discernible in any of the regressions: The average
residuals were not significant on or near the event date, and the cumu-
lative average residuals were not significant in any of several intervals
around the event date, revealed no nice pattern, and were of small
negative magnitude." Of course, since not all firms are potential
75 Romano, supra note 46, at 181-86.
76 1 chose Connecticut for the study of a fair price statute, even though its small population
of publicly traded firms reduces the power of the test, because, in addition to my ability to date
precisely its enactment, my knowledge of the legislative history could provide a useful interpre-
tative gloss on any results. Pennsylvania has the benefit of having a large pool of firms as well
as a short time from introduction to enactment, and Missouri had the shortest time from
introduction to passage of the states with control share acquisition statutes for which accurate
dates were available, although like Connecticut, it has too small a number of firms to provide a
powerful test.
77 The cumulative average residuals of Missouri firms that did not have fair price charter
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takeover targets, not all firms should be expected to experience abnor-
mal returns upon the enactment of these statutes. This seriously
weakens the power of the tests, because the aggregate portfolio could
be burying the impact of the legislation on the unidentifiable subset of
future target firms (although presumably the market also cannot pre-
dict in advance which firms are future targets). An ad hoc examina-
tion to see if this was a factor, by looking at the residuals of firms that
subsequently turned out to be targets, did not help. One Connecticut
firm, Scovill, Inc., was involved in a takeover fight shortly after the
Connecticut statute's enactment.7" However, Scovill's abnormal per-
formance was not greater than that of other Connecticut firms. In
addition, the returns of the proponent of the Connecticut legislation
were insignificantly negative.
In sum, the financial research on takeover statutes does not pro-
vide much information on the state competition debate. It cements
the intuition that these statutes, like most defensive tactics, will in-
crease the premiums target shareholders receive, possibly at the cost
of a reduction in the aggregate number of bids. Such a trade-off does
not indicate whether shareholders, managers, both, or neither, are
better off. To be sure, the event studies on reincorporation, which go
directly to that question, offer far greater support to the Winter posi-
tion than to the Cary position-there is no evidence of negative re-
turns to migrating firms (or to firms operating under Delaware law)
and some evidence of positive returns. But studies of specific statutes'
impact are even more inconclusive and are subject to substantial
methodological difficulties, given the limitations on obtaining precise
event dates for legislation. What we can say with some degree of con-
fidence is that reincorporation produces abnormal positive returns for
some firms (those engaging in certain transactions), and for the rest it
is a zero net present value transaction.79
provisions at the time the statute was enacted show an upward trend after the bill passed the
state Senate (t-statistic 1.2), in contrast to the residuals of the firms that already had such
provisions. In addition, in all the regressions, some average residuals were significant approxi-
mately one week after the event dates, but trying to draw conclusions from such data would be
equivalent to reading tea leaves.
78 While Scovill's management was not involved in the drafting or passage of the legisla-
tion, it hoped it would be protected by the law. In the end, the statute did not affect the bid
because it was an any-or-all offer.
79 Romano, supra note 1, at 272-73. Macey and Miller misuse this conclusion in their
paper when they assert that it was grounded in a survey of reincorporating firms and not the
event study. Macey & Miller, supra note 34, at 16. They are also mistaken in asserting that
the survey produced biased information because of self-serving answers by managers. The
explanations for reincorporations provided by respondents were independently verified by pub-
lic sources of information, wherever available. In addition, the respondents were not only
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IV. STABILITY AND OPTIMALITY IN STATE COMPETITION: A
MARKOV MODEL
One way to explore the dynamics of state competition is to use a
probabilistic model known as a Markov process.8 0 A system follow-
ing a Markov process embodies the intuition motivating the state
competition debate because its evolution through time can be concep-
tualized as propelled by the winner of a series of independent compet-
ing forces. The forces can be arrayed in a matrix that generates the
process and enables us to describe its likely progression. From such a
matrix, we can obtain the process' stationary or limiting probability
distribution, which indicates the long-run tendency of the system to
be in a specific state.
Such a model abstracts away a legislature's ability to control the
competitive process, and is analogous to an invisible hand. It is in the
spirit of the Hayekian view of the benefits of decentralization-the
spontaneous aggregation of information. It thus provides a rough
baseline approximation for assessing the optimality and stability of
the corporate charter market. It is a stylized story with the advantage
of a model, that of making assumptions explicit and of assessing ef-
fects of small changes in variables in the system. The model's benefits
are also its limitation: The dynamic properties of Markov processes
are definitional, such that if a process is Markov, it follows specific
rules. This means that an important initial focus of analysis is
whether such a process is an appropriate characterization of state
competition. Accordingly, I first detail the assumptions for modeling
state competition as a Markov process, and thereafter consider several
simple simulations for illustrating what the long-run tendency of the
system could be.
A. Defining the Process as Markov
The system we are modeling is the array of corporation laws of
the fifty states. To avoid confusion, I will refer to the real states as
jurisdictions and to Markov system states as states. A "state" of a
managers, but also legal counsel, both inhouse and outside, and the responses did not differ
systematically with the identity of the respondent.
80 Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser used a Markov process in their contribution to
the debate on the efficiency of the common law. Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Im-
prove the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1980). Their article inspired
this discussion. Additional use of such models can be found in R. Nelson & S. Winter, An
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). To capture the notion of jurisdictional
competition, I use a continuous-time Markov process, which is a Markov chain subordinated
to a Poisson process, rather than the discrete-time Markov chain that Cooter and Kornhauser
use.
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Markov system is the particular constellation of laws enacted in the
jurisdictions. A Markov process is a way of describing how a system
moves across its various states. For example, let us assume that there
are only three jurisdictions, A, B, and C, and two laws, 1 and 2. Table
Two lists the possible states of such a simple system. If, for instance,
the current state is: A has corporation law 1, B has corporation law 2,
and C has neither law, this is summarized in the table as the state
numbered nineteen. I will continue to use the word state, rather than
jurisdiction, to refer to real states when using the phrase "state
competition."
The information concerning a system's dynamics can be de-
scribed as a matrix; the matrix has rows and columns equal to the
total number of possible states (64 in our example). In a Markov pro-
cess, a system stays in a state for a random period of time and then
moves to another state, according to stable transitional probabilities.
State competition is depicted as a process that moves stochastically
from one set of laws in the jurisdictions to another set. To continue
our earlier example, C might decide to enact law 2. In this new state,
A has law 1, B has law 2, and C has law 2. In Table Two, this change
is a move from the state numbered nineteen to the state numbered
fifty-one. If we call the original state state i, and this new state statej,
the matrix entry (ij) indicates the force by which the system moves
from state i to state j. From this entry, we can derive a transitional
probability, Qj, that describes the likelihood of starting at i and mov-
ing to j, and time X (i), the actual staying time, or sojourn, of the
system in i before it moves. Remaining in a state, which is described
by the entry (i, i), may also be a movement of the process.
Two assumptions are necessary to describe the model as Markov,
which will enable us to use the mathematical properties of Markov
processes to study the evolution of the system. A third assumption
will be useful to explore the optimality of the system. The three as-
sumptions are:
A. 1: The number of states is finite.
A.2: Legislatures consider only the present set of laws and not
their history in deciding to adopt or repeal a particular law. In other
words, only the present state of the system is relevant for the future
state.
A.3: There is always a possibility that a law may be adopted or
repealed.
The first assumption of finite states is adopted primarily for
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mathematical convenience.8' It is neither inherently implausible nor
technically important to warrant discussion.
The second assumption is crucial, for it is the defining character-
istic of a Markov process-that the future is conditionally independ-
ent of the past, provided the present is known. This is not as
controversial as it may appear. It does not mean that studying legisla-
tive intent or legislative history of a statute is irrelevant. Rather, it
implies the plausible scenario that when a legislature is considering a
change in its corporation code, the probability of the change occur-
ring depends only on the legislators' knowledge of the current legal
regime-its own laws and the laws of other jurisdictions at that
time-and not on the history of when those laws came to be enacted.
Unlike courts, whose decisions are said to be constrained by prece-
dent, it is reasonable to posit that legislators approach each lawmak-
ing session from their knowledge of present conditions and needs.
For instance, legislators reintroduce bills that have failed in previous
sessions, and laws that were adopted in one session are often modified
in the very next session. 2 Moreover, conventional wisdom supports
this assumption in the constitutional maxim that one Congress cannot
bind a future Congress.
This second assumption contains a further, perhaps more dis-
putable, restriction on the legislative process: The probabilities of
change are independent of time. This means that the likelihood of
starting in state i and moving to statej (such as C's enactment of law
2 when A has law 1, B has law 2 and C originally has neither law)
remains the same throughout time, whether it is May or September,
1986 or 1926. More precisely, the transition probabilities depend only
81 If the state space of a Markov process is finite, then there are limiting probabilities that
are unique so that we can speak of a stationary or steady state of the system in which, in the
long run, it spends a fixed proportion of its time in each of the possible states. If the state space
is infinite, then these limiting probabilities may not exist, although a solution can be obtained
in terms of ratios of time spent in particular states. But even if the number of states is infinite,
if the process is non-null, which my other assumptions provide, then there is a unique station-
ary distribution. E. 4;inlar, Introduction to Stochastic Processes 264 (1975). A. 1 is therefore
technically not required to guarantee the uniqueness of a steady state. However, finiteness
ensures certain regularities in the Markov process that exclude the occurrence of instantaneous
states, which are states that the process jumps out of as soon as it enters them. Id. at 243-44.
Such states make little sense in the legislative context, as the deliberation process takes time,
and therefore, A. I is a useful assumption. I do not make any assumption concerning aperio-
dicity because in a continuous-time Markov process, periodicities disappear in the steady state.
82 See, e.g., 19 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. 84-85 [Jan. 1987] (BNA) (Sen. D'Amato introduced S.
227, tender offer reform bill, identical to bill introduced in previous session). Connecticut's
second generation takeover statute, which was enacted in the Spring of 1984, 1984 Conn. Acts
716, P.A. 84-431 (Reg. Sess.), was modified in the next session to repeal the exemption for
firms that had an interested 10% shareholder, 1985 Conn. Acts 384, P.A. 85-283 (Reg. Sess.)
codified as amended at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-374(a) -374(c) (West Supp. 1986).
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upon the state in which the system is and not the time at which it is in
the state.8 3 This would be a troublesome restriction if, for instance,
legislators behave differently at election time, or if the probabilities of
passage differ dramatically with the composition of the legislature.8 4
I believe, however, that the homogeneity restriction does not cre-
ate serious difficulty in the corporate law context. First, one of the
consistent features in the enactment of corporation laws, illustrated
by the politics of Connecticut's second generation takeover statute, is
the bipartisan, near unanimous, support for such provisions. 85 Sec-
ond, corporation laws are generally not a salient issue in election cam-
paigns. Third, we can rely on the notion of a "critical election" to
maintain that when new representatives take office the transition func-
tion does not change. Political scientists have theorized that on cer-
tain rare occasions, such as the election ushering in Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal, a critical political realignment of interests oc-
curs and profoundly changes the course of history. 6 Only after such
an election would the probabilities of legislative responses to a given
set of laws change. Thus, at a minimum for the extended periods of
time in routine politics, a Markov process is a reasonable approxima-
tion for modeling state competition.
The third assumption affects results concerning the optimality of
the system. The only means of ensuring that the system moves to and
stays in the optimal state is to assign zero probability to the repeal of a
value-maximizing law and a probability of one to the adoption of a
value-maximizing law. This third assumption rules out such a guar-
antee. 7 It can be analogized to an assumption of bounded rationality
on the part of legislatures, that they do not always recognize a value-
maximizing law and they legislate by trial and error. Moreover, it
captures an important institutional detail of corporate law: All juris-
dictions have statutes reserving to themselves the power to alter any
corporate law provision and to impose that change on firms that were
83 This is the requirement that the Markov process be time homogeneous. The transition
function incorporates the time spent in a state before the process changes; the process is time
independent in that the probabilities are unaffected by the sojourn time in the state and the
time at which the state is entered.
84 If elections were not held at fixed intervals but occurred randomly, and therefore fol-
lowed an exponential distribution, then the problem that the election process could disturb the
time homogeneity requirement of a Markov chain would be avoided. Elections in parliamen-
tary systems satisfy such a condition, as the prime minister calls the election.
85 See Romano, supra note 46, at 128, 138.
86 W. Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (1970). The
critical-election literature has serious theoretical problems since it is an ex post characteriza-
tion of events, lacking predictive content.
87 More precisely, A.3 ensures that there is no absorbing state, which may be defined as a
state from which the process never leaves.
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chartered under the previous law. 88 The model of the process thereby
adopted is a relatively weak form of the shareholder wealth-max-
imization branch of the state competition debate, which accords best
with the empirical studies, for it can weight the transition probabili-
ties to favor moves to more optimal states and disfavor moves in the
opposite direction, yet it cannot rule out those reverse moves.
These three assumptions are sufficient to characterize competi-
tion as a Markov process and to attain the Markov property that
there is a unique set of transition probabilities into which the process
settles, which is independent of where it began. The trigger of
change-the source of the motion of the process-is itself a random
process that may depend on the other jurisdictions. There are at least
three possible methods that spur a legislature to reconsider its legal
regime, and all may stem from the existence of other jurisdictions: (1)
corporate interests lobby the legislature to innovate or imitate by
bringing its laws in line with those of other jurisdictions, as in the case
of the Connecticut second generation takeover statute, (2) corporate
capital leaves the jurisdiction as some firms reincorporate or as share-
holders alter their portfolios and firm values decline, as suggested by
the Cary and Winter hypotheses, and (3) legislators themselves inno-
vate or keep abreast of developments in other jurisdictions and sug-
gest trying proven or popular measures that they think will help
solidify their political positions. I assume that the occurrence of any
of these factors, which brings a law to the legislature's attention and
calls into play the Markov transition probabilities, follows a random
path. 89
88 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 394 (1984). See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and
Materials on Corporations 147-48 (5th ed. 1980). These reservation statutes are typically in-
corporated into the firm's incorporation documents. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 394 (1984)
("[The corporation law] and all amendments thereof shall be a part of the charter or certificate
of incorporation of every corporation.").
89 For mathematical convenience, I assume that the random process that sets in motion the
transition between states is independent of the destination state and memory-less, that is, the
sojourn time follows a Poisson process. This means that the interarrival times, where an arri-
val is the time at which a legislature begins to consider a statutory change, are independent and
identically exponentially distributed. The timing of the legislature's consideration of a reform
is such that, knowing that the time elapsed since the last consideration of a law is t units long
does not alter the probability of the interval lasting another s units of time. Although certain
laws, such as budgets, are considered at fixed times of the year, it seems reasonable to treat the
review of corporation laws as following such a random process. If the timing of legislative
consideration is not exponentially distributed, the process could be modeled stochastically as a
more general Markov renewal process. The added complexity in the calculations that would
be necessary to relax the restriction on interarrival times would not, in my opinion, produce a
commensurate gain in explanatory power.
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Table Two. States of a Simple System (3 Jurisdictions, 2 Laws)
1 000 17 000 33 0 1 1 49 00 1
000 01 1 001 1 10
2 100 18 000 34 100 50 010
000 1 1 1 1 10 101
3 0 1 0 19 100 35 100 51 100
000 010 101 01 1
4 001 20 100 36 010 52 11 1
000 00 1 110 1 00
5 000 21 010 37 010 53 11 1
100 001 01 1 010
6 000 22 010 38 001 54 1 1 1
010 100 101 001
7 000 23 00 1 39 00 1 55 100
001 100 0 11 1 1 1
8 100 24 001 40 110 56 010
100 010 101 111
9 0 10 25 1 10 41 10 1 57 00 1
010 110 110 111
10 001 26 101 42 1 10 58 1 1 1
001 101 011 0 1 1
11 1 1 0 27 0 1 1 43 0 1 1 59 1 1 1
000 01 1 1 10 101
12 101 28 1 10 44 101 60 1 1 1
000 100 011 1 10
13 0 1 1 29 10 1 45 0 1 1 61 0 1 1
000 100 101 1 1 1
14 1 1 1 30 1 10 46 1 10 62 10 1
000 010 001 1 1 1
15 000 31 0 1 1 47 10 1 63 1 10
110 010 010 111
16 000 32 10 1 48 0 1 1 64 1 1 1
101 001 100 1 1 1
Key: for each state, row 1 = law 1, row 2 = law 2; col. 1 = jurisdiction A,
col. 2 = jurisdiction B, col. 3 = jurisdiction C; 0 = no law, 1 = law
B. Simulating Competition
We can now construct the matrix that generates the process, tells
us how and when the process is likely to move, and can be used to
compute the steady state. This special generator matrix neatly de-
scribes an evolutionary process, for its entries are forces competing to
1987] 745
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move the system. It reflects local and not global changes, treating all
the laws in all the jurisdictions but one as frozen. The text describes
the system's essentials; the notes present the functional form from
which the entries in the matrix are derived. To operationalize a
Markov model as a "test" to resolve the state competition debate
would require a vast number of observations of the frequency with
which legislatures consider and reconsider particular statutes and
with which those laws are actually changed. I cannot even begin to
undertake such a task, and instead I simulate a system's motion with
processes whose transition probabilities are not empirically derived.
The model's value is therefore primarily heuristic. It pinpoints the
behavioral assumptions on which hypotheses of the optimality and
stability of state competition must be based, as well as the impact that
changing crucial variables and assumptions will have on the process,
within the general framework of our understanding of the corporate
charter market.
To capture state competition in the generator matrix of the
Markov process, the competing forces must be a function of the
number of other jurisdictions having particular laws and the array of
laws in the jurisdiction considering the change. As the number of
jurisdictions with a given law increases, this environment has a
greater influence on a jurisdiction's decision to retain, repeal, or adopt
that law. The jurisdiction's own laws temper an automatic reaction to
the situation in the other jurisdictions. For example, in some simula-
tions I assume that less weight is given to the law's absence in other
jurisdictions if the jurisdiction in which legislative action is under
consideration already has the law in place.
To incorporate the notion that it is costly to change the status
quo, I assign positive weights to all states. This is plausible because
adopting or repealing a law takes time and money and involves risks.
Legislators have to engage in bargaining and may lose constituents'
votes in a future election. I typically make the likelihood of repeal a
function of the state by making it inversely related to the number of
other jurisdictions with the law. In addition, to explore the value-
maximizing hypothesis, I vary the assumption of whether repeal is as
likely as adoption.
Five sets of assumptions from which values of a generator matrix
are derived, and their corresponding steady states, will be examined.
Recall that to use a Markov process, legal change is incremental. Ac-
cordingly, the system's movement is restricted; it cannot move from
one state to any other state. A move of the system consists of one
jurisdiction either retaining the status quo or changing it by either
746 [Vol. 8:709
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adopting or repealing a statute.90 For example, from state nineteen, in
which jurisdiction A has law 1 and B has law 2, the system can move
to one of six other states (states two, six, thirty, thirty-four, forty-
seven, and fifty-one); either A can repeal law 1 or adopt law 2, B can
repeal law 2 or adopt law 1, or C can adopt either law 1 or law 2. The
system can also remain in state nineteen.
The first three simulated processes assume that the three jurisdic-
tions are identical-that is, the transitions for one jurisdiction adopt-
ing or repealing a law are the same as the transitions for any other
jurisdiction. Within this general symmetrical framework, three alter-
native generator matrices are constructed, depicting various patterns
of legislative behavior to approximate, by degrees, state competition.
In the first, the forces compelling a statute's adoption or its repeal are
symmetrical. A symmetry restriction equates the costs of adopting a
law and of repealing it. Thus, the status quo changes-a law is either
repealed or adopted-with the same frequency. Two factors affect the
legislature's decision: the number of other jurisdictions with the stat-
ute, a feature that captures the notion of imitation, that state competi-
tion entails jurisdictions reacting to what others do, and the state of
the jurisdiction contemplating legislative action.9' The symmetry
condition on the direction of change in the first process is equivalent
90 This is not as restrictive an assumption as it appears because consideration of changes is
controlled by the arrival process; given that this is a continuous-time model and the process is
Poisson, it is technically possible for several changes to occur very close in time, in keeping
with a legislature's deliberation on a package of corporate law reforms.
91 The desirable relation, g(n), between the jurisdiction's response and the state of other
jurisdictions must be an increasing function that is always positive, but always less than one.
In this way, the jurisdictions have some stochastic independence from imitation: A jurisdiction
may adopt a law even though no other jurisdiction has the law, and it may not adopt a law
even though all other jurisdictions have the law. The specific form I used to derive transition
values (the entries in the generator matrix, A) to solve for the steady state is:
2 +
a° = kl gk (nk) + syk, all i 5 j where k indexes the two laws and gA (nk) = Ni
. 
is
the number of other jurisdictions, besides the jurisdiction considering legislative action, with
law k in the origin state i and destination state j, and so. indexes the state of the jurisdiction
considering action. The denominator of g, 4, equals N + 1, where N = the maximum number
of jurisdictions, a form chosen so that g(n) would take the appropriate shape were more juris-
dictions included in the system. There are only three values ofgk(n) because n has only three
possible values, (0,1,2), and these are, correspondingly (.0156, .125, .4219). There are 8 possi-
ble so's, as i andj index 4 states: no law, law 1, law 2, both laws; the k index for the law under
consideration matters only in some of the nonrandom processes. In the random process, sij
takes on one of two values, 0 when the move is between a state of no and one law, and .0156
when the move is between a state of one and both laws. The diagonal entries of A, aj for all i =
j, equal the negative of the sum of the other entries in the row. The rows of A sum to zero, for
it is the derivative of the matrix of transition probabilities when the process has yet to begin,
that is, when time = 0. The steady state is found by solving the system of equations vA = 0,
where Y is the vector of the probabilities of the stationary distribution.
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to assuming that legislators cannot distinguish a value-maximizing
law from a non-value-maximizing one. A legislature that is blind to a
law's value-maximizing properties would not know the effects of the
law it is considering, and under such circumstances, it is possible to
assume that any change in the status quo is equally likely. I will refer
to this process as a random process.
The second process retains the assumption that jurisdictions are
identical, but adjusts response rates downward for repealing a law, in
a negative relation to the number of other jurisdictions with the law
(that is, repeal is less likely if two other jurisdictions have the law than
if no one else has the law).92 This is intended to represent the behav-
ior of a weakly-optimizing legislature. If a law under consideration is
a value-maximizing one, then for an optimizing legislature, the law's
adoption will be more likely than its repeal. Moreover, if a law's per-
sistence across jurisdictions is a signal of its welfare-enhancing
properties, then even if the legislators cannot identify a value-maxi-
mizing law, they can hope to do so by imitating other jurisdictions.
However, consistent with A.3, neither possibility, repeal or adoption,
is undertaken with probability one or zero. I will refer to this process
as the weak v-m process, where v-m stands for value-maximizing. It
is a weak story of charter market optimality because there is no guar-
antee of a statute's passage nor of its retention, yet its movement is
weighted toward optimality by the asymmetry in repeal and adoption
response rates. 93 One way to interpret this model is that legislators
know one of the two laws is value-maximizing but they do not know
which one it is, and consequently, they treat adoption more favorably
than repeal to be on the safe side. The findings of the empirical re-
search-no negative abnormal returns and sometimes positive abnor-
mal returns upon reincorporation- seem to fit most closely with such
a story.
The third process modeled, in which the jurisdictions are inter-
changeable, is intended to present a stronger value-maximizing world.
To investigate optimality, only one of the two laws, law 1, is assumed
to be value-maximizing, and the other law, law 2, is assumed to be
92 The syk values are adjusted so that syk = 1, all k, for an adoption but Sik = -gA(nk) for a
repeal.
93 Assuming the costs of repeal and adoption are asymmetrical may be more realistic than
assuming symmetry. Although I consider the different structures to be related to the substan-
tive content of the law as value-maximizing, this need not be the case. For instance, unspeci-
fied procedural factors, such as the growth of vested interests, might make repeal more difficult
than adoption. Cf. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 390 (1983)(organized public interest groups arise after passage of legisla-
tion). Clearly, what is needed is what we do not have, a theory of the production function of a
state legislature.
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non-value-maximizing. This is in keeping with the fact that many ju-
risdictions have adopted takeover statutes whose benefits to share-
holders are disputed. In contrast to the weak v-m process, in which
the legislature cannot distinguish perfectly between laws, in this
strong v-m process, the adoption and repeal rates are further adjusted
to favor having the value-maximizing law.94 It is more plausible to
label the favored law as value-maximizing rather than managerialist
because the empirical literature has only been able to document posi-
tive rather than negative effects on firms from changing legal regimes.
Table Three lists the stationary distributions for the different
processes. In the random process, the system stays, as expected, in
each state an equal proportion of the time. In the weak v-m process,
the steady state looks quite different, and accords with intuition. The
system spends increasingly more time in the states in which more ju-
risdictions have both laws, and in particular, all three jurisdictions
have both laws for about one-third of the time. The system is never in
the state in which no jurisdiction has any law. However, as we would
expect, the strong v-m process spends less time in the states with the
non-value-maximizing law and more time in the states with only the
value-maximizing law, than does the weak v-m process. Comparing
the limiting probabilities of states fourteen and eighteen makes the
point graphically: The system shifts from spending an approximately
equal time in these two states in the weak v-m process to spending
about twenty times as much time in state fourteen in which all juris-
dictions have the value-maximizing law than in state eighteen in
which they all have the non-value-maximizing law in the strong v-m
process, which represents a threefold increase across the processes.
The strong v-m system's tendency is to spend a longer period of time
in the long run in the more optimal states, but a substantial propor-
tion of time is spent in suboptimal states. Moreover, the steady state
of both v-m processes is more in accord with the observed S-shaped
diffusion pattern in corporate law reforms, in which over time more,
though not all, states come to have a law, than is the steady state of
the random process.
To increase the realism of the simulated systems, two additional
generator matrices were created in which the process incorporates dif-
ferent response rates for the jurisdictions. In keeping with the Dela-
94 The response values for the value-maximizing law, which I assign as law 1, g1(n 1), follow
those for the undifferentiated processes, see supra note 91. The response values for law 2,
g 2(n2) are simply 1/2 of those for law 1, (.0078,.0625,.2109) for n = (0,1,2) respectively. The
sjk, when the move is to adopt, equal 1 for law 1 (k = 1) and .5 for law 2 (k =2); when the move
is to repeal, sik = "gk(nA), where k is the law to be repealed.
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ware phenomenon, the probabilities for one of the jurisdiction's
actions are changed. For jurisdiction A, a statute's adoption is more,
and its repeal less, likely than for the other two jurisdictions.95 In
addition, the probabilities for the reactions of the other two jurisdic-
tions are altered to make the statute's adoption more, and its repeal
less, likely when A has adopted the law. This process captures the
idea of innovation, in a limited way, in addition to imitation, for the
first jurisdiction has a higher probability of adopting a law when no
other jurisdiction has the law as well as a lower likelihood of repeal. I
will call this the Delaware process. The final process combines the
features of the Delaware and the strong v-m processes. Jurisdiction
A 's differential adoption and repeal rates and correspondingly its ef-
fect on the other jurisdictions, are adjusted to favor the value-maxi-
mizing law, law 1, and to disfavor law 2, the non-value-maximizing
law, to a greater extent than the other two jurisdictions. 96 I will call
this the strong Delaware process.
As Table Three indicates, this change away from anonymity of
jurisdictions intensifies the results of the v-m processes. The same re-
lation in the steady state holds between the different states: the fre-
quencies are substantially greater for the states in which two or three
jurisdictions have both laws than for the states in which only one ju-
risdiction has the law, and in the strong Delaware process, they are
even greater for states with the value-maximizing law than those with
the non-value-maximizing law. However, the differential between
these sets of states is greater in the Delaware processes than in their
corresponding v-m processes, as is the actual frequency spent in the
states in which all three jurisdictions have a law (compare, for exam-
ple, the limiting probabilities of states fourteen, eighteen, and sixty-
four). The time spent in states in which only two jurisdictions have a
law is less in the Delaware processes than in the corresponding v-m
processes. Thus, the Delaware processes result in greater uniformity
in corporation codes than the anonymous v-m processes.
95 If the jurisdiction is Delaware (where I assign the first jurisdiction to be "Delaware") Sk
= 2, all k, if the move is to adopt, sij = -vg ,(nk) if the move is to repeal, where v takes the
values (5/4, 25/24, 1015/1000) for n = (0,1,2) respectively. If the jurisdiction is other than
Delaware and Delaware does not have the law, the sqk's are the same as those for the analogous
weak v-m process, see supra notes 91-92, 94. If the jurisdiction is not Delaware but Delaware
has the law, then sjk = 3/2 if the move is to adopt and sj = - wgk(nk) if the move is to repeal,
where w takes the values (1, 33/32, 101/100) for n = (0,1,2) respectively.
96 Entries for the value-maximizing law are unchanged except they now follow the analo-
gous strong v-m process. Entries for the non-value-maximizing law are adjusted as follows.
For Delaware, s2 = 1/4 for adoption and s#2 = - (1/2)vgk(n) for repeal. For the other
jurisdictions when Delaware has the non-value-maximizing law, s'q = 1/2 for adoption and sijA
= -( 1/2)wgk(nk) for repeal.
[Vol. 8:709











































































































































































































































































































































HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo L. Rev.  751 1986-1987
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Three conclusions, which are relatively uncontroversial, can be
drawn from the simulations of the evolution of a corporate charter
market:
1. The steady-state results of the Markov processes that were
adopted to incorporate value-maximizing behavior are more in accord
with the observed patterns in corporation codes than are those of a
random response process.
2. If there is any uncertainty about legislators' ability to iden-
tify value-maximizing proposals, such that value-maximizing laws are
not adopted for sure and have some positive probability of repeal,
then the system will, in the long run, spend some time in suboptimal
states.
3. Although heroic assumptions concerning legislative behavior
are needed to guarantee that a system will evolve to the optimal state,
with relatively weak behavioral assumptions that have a plausible ba-
sis, we can construct a dynamic process in which a system spends the
greater proportion of its time in the more optimal states (states in
which most or all jurisdictions adopt value-maximizing laws).
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW LEARNING ON STATE
COMPETITION (OR WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?)
The new learning on state competition provides us with a good
understanding of the economics, and some inkling of the political dy-
namics, of the corporate charter market. What conclusions can we
draw for public policy?
1. A middle ground between Cary's and Winter's positions on
the efficacy of state competition seems to me to be most appropriate.
Such a view recognizes that shareholders benefit from state competi-
tion, while granting that, on occasion, competition may well produce
laws that shareholders in some firms would not choose to adopt vol-
untarily. To review the data informing this conclusion:
(i) Event studies indicate that state competition does not harm
shareholders. None of the studies found any negative effect on inves-
tor wealth from state regulation, whether they investigated changes
made by the states in statutes or doctrine, or changes made by firms in
their choice of incorporation state, and more importantly, they found
a positive effect of reincorporation on stock prices.
(ii) There is a plausible logical scenario, supported by anecdotal
evidence, that suggests that managers promote second generation
takeover statutes because they cannot obtain shareholder approval for
the tactics these laws codify, although statistical tests related to this
thesis were inconclusive.
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(iii) There is good reason to believe that the political equilib-
rium in Delaware differs from that of other states when it comes to a
potentially managerialist provision like a second generation takeover
statute, because its diverse corporate constituency and the corporate
bar's input into the legislative process check any one firm's ability to
have a pet bill passed.
(iv) Simple stochastic models of the dynamics of a corporate
charter market indicate that the processes that capture some key fea-
tures of state competition by employing weak behavioral assumptions
spend a significant amount of time in the more optimal states, but
some time will be spent in suboptimal states, unless we adopt quite
strong constraints on legislative behavior, such as perfect foresight, so
that value-maximizing laws must always be adopted and never
repealed.
Staking out a position somewhere between Cary's and Winter's
views-and I locate my position as closer to the Winter than the Cary
endpoint of the interval-is not that appealing because it both con-
veys the appearance of hedging one's bets and requires detailed empir-
ical analysis of individual code provisions before any conclusion can
be reached. But it is, in my opinion, the most reasonable position to
advocate, given current knowledge. It recognizes the agency problem
that Winter's position downplays, while concurring in his assessment
of the important advantages derived from having a federal system. A
corollary of the position is that we should invest less energy in dis-
cussing whether national chartering is needed,97 and more in examin-
ing state regulation at a micro level, to determine how we can
improve the federal system.
2. One method to protect shareholders without having to iden-
tify precisely which rules maximize shareholder wealth and which do
not, is to require that corporation code amendments entailing a major
change in relations between shareholders and managers, where we can
intuit conflicting interests, such as second generation takeover stat-
97 Even apart from the lack of empirical support, the analytical case for national charter-
ing, in my opinion, has not been made. Most of the benefits of federalism have been empha-
sized in the debate, such as the incremental experimentation and innovation in corporate law
rules created by having numerous decisionmakers. One benefit often overlooked in the corpo-
rate law literature, that I find important, is the supportive relation between a federal structure
and individual liberty. Vital state governments can check a powerful national government,
(for an interesting effort to revitalize this view of Federalism, see A. Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View of Sovereignty and Federalism (draft Aug. 1986)) (available at Cardozo Law Library),
just as private organizations also protect individuals from encroachment by the state by coun-
terbalancing the state's power, see J. Coleman, The Asymmetric Society 51-55 (1982). If cor-
porations were subject to comprehensive national regulation, they would be less effective
performers of such a checking function.
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utes, contain opt-in rather than opt-out provisions.9" For an opt-in
regime can minimize the possibility that management will lobby suc-
cessfully for legislation that shareholders might not support, since
shareholders must explicitly approve the law's application to their
firm. An opt-in policy is an extension of the basic feature of corpora-
tion codes-that they are enabling. The benefit of this approach is
that it is a strategy by which shareholders, rather than managers, lob-
byists, or legislators, have the ultimate say on corporate governance
by voting.99 In addition, by increasing the cost of corporate decision-
making by requiring a shareholder vote, it tends to add to the stability
of the status quo of no shark repellent amendment.'I This is a desira-
ble feature if shark repellent amendments are harmful to sharehold-
ers. The disadvantage is, for firms whose shareholders want the
statute's protection, the cost is greater in an opt-in than an opt-out
regime where no such vote is required.
(i) The conventional objection to relying on such a device is
that voting is a sham because shareholders lack either the information
to vote intelligently or the inclination to expend time and resources to
obtain the information. I do not find the claim of massive shareholder
ignorance and misinformation compelling. But even if the objection is
granted, it can be resolved directly, by ensuring the provision of the
pertinent information to investors.' 0' Government intervention is not
always necessary to ameliorate a market failure. In this context, insti-
98 Cf. M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 88 (1976) (share-
holders should vote on fundamental changes). A similarly spirited proposal is to require
shareholder approval of defensive tactics, such as poison pills; see SEC Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations, reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), Special
Report No. 1028, at 37-40 (July 15, 1983) (recommending annual shareholder advisory votes
on golden parachutes, standstill agreements, and supermajority and disenfranchisement char-
ter provisions).
99 Delaware's latest revision to its code is a good example of such a policy: It does not
eliminate director liability, but rather, it permits a firm to limit its directors' liability by charter
amendment. S.B. 533, enacted June 18, 1986, to be codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7). The political process of this bill provides an interesting comparison with that of
other state statutes. In contrast to the adoption of Connecticut's takeover statute, in which the
corporate bar organization was excluded from the drafting process, Delaware's director liabil-
ity statute was approved by the corporate law section of the state bar association prior to its
enactment. As Judge Moore informs us in his comments in this symposium, this practice of
bar approval is the rule, and not the exception, in Delaware.
100 Cf. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 207, 218-
22 (1984) (describing how government structure mitigates faction and increases stability of
legislation).
101 There is no convincing basis for asserting that shareholders will be so overwhelmed by
the information that an indirect solution of prohibition should be adopted. Cf. Grether,
Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Dis-
closure, 59 So. Cal. L. Rev. 277 (1986) (questioning the contention of an information-overload
problem in commercial law). If the fear is the free rider problem that afflicts all voting
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tutional investors, who are typically informed voters, have recently
begun to create national organizations for pooling information and
research on corporate policies. 102 These voluntary networks could, in
due course, produce substantially more informed voting.
(ii) One potential problem for even informed shareholder vot-
ing is that management controls the proxy apparatus. This is a prob-
lem because if there are many points in the set of majority-preferred
outcomes, then management can place on the agenda the particular
proposal that it prefers from the winning set.103 But if shareholder
preferences are homogeneous-which is a plausible assumption in
corporate law for all shareholders have the same goal of equity share
price maximization-then the majority-preferred set will consist of a
single point and management's control of the agenda cannot deter-
mine the outcome.
3. If institutional investors' interests differ sharply from those
of individual investors, who are uninformed and/or who do not vote,
then reliance on voting rights to protect all shareholders will be un-
successful. This possibility might conjure up the specter of manage-
ment agenda manipulation, but if the differences are such that
shareholder preferences can be represented as single-peaked, arrayed
along a single line-which is reasonable given the value-maximizing
goal-then, again, there will be no voting cycle and the shareholders
determine the outcome regardless of management's position. The
concern is therefore not that the outcome will be chosen by manage-
ment but that the interest of the majority is in direct conflict with that
of the minority. In other contexts where shareholders' interests may
differ because of institutional characteristics, such as the different po-
sitions of high-and low-tax-bracket investors on distribution policies,
there is evidence of a clientele effect, in which investors segregate
themselves by firm according to similar interests, and thereby avoid
the potential conflict so that majority rule poses no difficulty."° But
processes, supermajority conditions could be attached to the amendment process, although I
am skeptical that such a solution would be optimal.
102 For example, in 1985, a group of public and private pension fund trustees formed the
Council of Institutional Investors to "protect their rights as shareholders" by collecting data
and providing information and consulting services for members. Pension Fund Trustees Form
Council, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1985, at D1; Institutional Investors Join Forces for Clout, id.,
May 12, 1985, at Fl. See also Appearances Likely to Prove Deceiving When It Comes to T.
Boone Pickens, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1986, at 6, col. 1 (corporate raider to establish group to
lobby for shareholder rights). In addition, the Investor Responsibility Research Center com-
piles annual reports on institutional investors' voting on corporate governance questions. '
103 See K. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions (draft May 1984)
(available at Cardozo Law Library).
104 See Lewellen, Stanley, Lease & Schlarbaum, Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend
Clientele Phenomenon, 33 J. Fin. 1385 (1978).
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this solution may not be available to diffuse the conflict with which we
are concerned: For example, takeover policies affect so many firms
that clienteles may be unable to form because it may be difficult to
exclude investments in targets, assuming they can be identified, and
achieve optimal portfolio diversification. The policy punch of these
considerations is not clear cut. We may have to rethink the use of
majority rule to alter rights in corporate law, for it presupposes share-
holder unanimity on ends. But there are at least three factors mitigat-
ing such a concern. First, majority rules that permit disproportionate
premiums may not be objectionable; the nonpro rata sharing may be a
return on the shareholder's investment in information. Such rewards
to information-seeking may be necessary for market efficiency. 05 Sec-
ond, there have been and may continue to be fundamental changes in
the form of ownership of public corporations, such that uninformed
investors with small holdings may come to hold shares only indirectly
via mutual funds, 106 which would moot the potential conflict. Third,
if prices or some other datum signal to uninformed shareholders the
view of the informed, then the voting outcome may be identical to the
voting outcome under complete information."10
4. When we consider the issue of informed voting by sharehold-
ers in light of the politics of Connecticut's second generation takeover
statute, a further recommendation is in order: Bills substantively re-
vising corporation codes should be scrutinized and debated in a public
hearing. This policy will raise the cost of legislating, but it will also
provide a check on the passage of hastily drafted statutes that can
have unintended, adverse consequences. A legislature should be more
than a clearing house for pork barrel. With a public hearing, a legis-
lature could improve the quality of decisionmaking by drawing on the
insights of experts testifying concerning the probable consequences of
particular policies in reaching a judgment on a bill.10  It would, at
least, promote a more active role for the corporate bar in the legisla-
1o5 See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 549 (1984) (discussing market efficiency). The rewards may also be shared by the unin-
formed-some of the information of sophisticated investors will be conveyed in the stock price
as they trade, and some uninformed shareholders will tender in two-step offers and receive the
same disproportionate share as the informed.
106 See Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Trea-
tises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 564-65 (1981).
107 See R. McKelvey & P. Ordeshook, Information, Electoral Equilibria and the Demo-
cratic Ideal (manuscript 1986) (complete information equilibrium attained despite incomplete
information as uninformed voters update from very general and cheap information sources
such as opinion polls) (available at Cardozo Law Library).
108 See W. Muir, Legislature (1982) (state legislature is a school in which legislators are
educated by lobbyists and other informed individuals).
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tive process. The bar's participation offers the benefit that its mem-
bers represent clients with diverse interests, and a package that meets
their approval would be more likely attuned to the problems of unin-
tended consequences, if not more balanced in its effects, than a draft
submitted by one anxious corporation.' 9 In addition, hearings create
a record of a proposal's strengths and weaknesses that shareholders
can use in assessing whether to agree to conform their charters to the
revised codes.
5. A middle ground on state competition has specific implica-
tions for the direction of research. In particular, we need to under-
take more comparative studies of the political process across states
and statutes, and compile information on shareholder attitudes and
voting patterns on different corporate policies or management actions.
To the extent that the events of importance involve evolutionary
processes, we may need to seek out new and refine existing techniques
on how to determine the impact of specific policies on investor wealth.
Without such information, discussion will devolve into ill-informed a
priori assertions about the probable effects of particular rules, and we
will correspondingly be unable to raise the quality of public
decisionmaking.
109 The introduction of attorneys obviously creates the potential for additional agency
problems concerning their advocacy of the client's interests in the legislative process. In addi-
tion to the constraints placed on attorneys from the forces of state competition, see supra note
39, a competitive market for legal services should constrain attorneys from favoring their own
interests at a cost to shareholders.
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